

AAAS

Point out the "Way"—however dimly,
and lost among the host—as does the evening
star to those who tread their path in darkness.
—*The Voice of the Silence*

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FROM GUILT TO PUNISHMENT

An old reprobate even though warned by his doctor is unable to resist the temptations of the flesh. The wine of arrogance is in his head; the gold of greed is in his pocket; his blood is stirred by the din of possessive passion as he marches to the house of the harlot, and sells his Soul to the devil of selfishness.

Such is the picture that political Europe presents and she has imitators all over the world. Once on a downward grade it is most difficult to take advantage of any opportunity that circumstances present toward an upward movement. Though the peoples of the world have been through the ghastly experience of war and its terrible sufferings they do not seem to have learnt its lessons. Greed, hatred, fear and passion were the roots of the last War. They were not recognized in 1914, for over them was drawn the veil of Maya—nationalistic patri-

otism, the cause of culture, defence of the god-given soil, the good of the world. Those were the deceiving slogans of the day. They were not recognized later at Versailles, for then the ever-changing Maya had assumed still other hues: of future peace, of homes for heroes, of a world ever safe for democracy. Even when digging the foundation for the League of Nations the roots of the giant tree were stealthily nurtured. Laws of Economics and Politics were considered, but Moral Principles appeared merely as figures of speech in the orations of representatives of the high contracting parties. Brotherhood of all humanity, sacrifice of the strong nation for the good of the weak, respectful consideration for age-old civilizations, or for the rights of savage-races—those were not practical enough propositions. Absence of such moral principles is responsible for the League's numerous failures and the weak-

ness of its position despite a few minor successes and much good work. To-day once more greed, hatred, fear and passion are to the fore, in Eastern Asia, on the Mediterranean, in North-East Africa. Once again we hear bombastic talk of civilizing the uncivilized—a web of words hiding greed and lust for power. For sixteen years the secret forces of fear against enmity, of hurt pride against victorious strength; for sixteen years silent preparation to meet the greedy foe, or to overtake the unprepared poor; for sixteen years a proletarian exploitation to match imperialistic exploitation, and a fascistic autocracy to rival communistic autocracy. It has veritably been a rake's progress, and now that progress is fast approaching its nemesis which

Just though mysterious, leads us on unerring
Through ways unmark'd from guilt to punishment.

What is the way out for this civilization?

We have selected four recent pronouncements, each of which is important and they are significant and also typical.

Mr. H. G. Wells after studying for a second time the New Deal of President Roosevelt has returned to his home somewhat dubious about the success of that experiment in the U. S. A. His study has confirmed his pessimism over the safety of our civilization. In an article to the *New York Foreign Affairs* on "Civilization on Trial," after surveying the international situation he says:—

Unless men can get outside their national limitations, and unless they

can tackle economic and financial and monetary problems with something bigger than their national equipment, I think it is not a question of centuries but of decades before we see our civilization going down. And it will not be for the first time. The problem is to make peace successful...If humanity fails, it will fail for the lack of organized mental effort and for no other reason.

This is excellent but what is the remedy put forward? Mr. Wells has "no panacea to offer." But he does proffer his solution:—

Is it not possible for the English-speaking communities to begin getting together upon the answers to some of the financial riddles, the economic riddles and the political riddles that paralyze us?

Instancing the co-operation between the U. S. A. and Canada against smuggling he says:—

Suppose some one saw the opportunity for this sort of thing on a larger scale. Suppose some one saw the possibility of having the United States fleet in the Pacific and the British fleet in the Atlantic, instead of having a British fleet in the Pacific and the American fleet in the Pacific, and a British fleet in the Atlantic and an American fleet in the Atlantic. Is it impossible? What makes it impossible? What divergence of purpose stands in the way?

The English-speaking community to impose peace upon the World! "What divergence of purpose stands in the way?" Financial, economic and political riddles apparently cause the divergence; but trace them all to a moral root, and we shall find that national pride and ambition, lust and greed are there. Moreover, even though generous, fair and

chivalrous principles of conduct were adopted by the U. S. A. and the British Commonwealth towards each other in the cause of unity, there still remains the rest of the world. Partial Brotherhoods like half-truths, are dangerous; the world as a whole would not breathe an air of peace and security. Rivalries of non-English speaking peoples would beget an organism to match "that English-danger." The idea, however attractive it may sound, is lined with risk; similarly a comity of White Nations against the Coloured Races would prove not only dangerous but futile in the extreme. Mechanical progress has made the world a compact whole; any project which does not take that *whole* into fair and just account is bound to fail. At the present stage, encumbered with their respective commitments, and with the League of Nations breathing at Geneva, neither the U. S. A. nor Britain is morally free to move in the direction suggested by Mr. Wells.

The second pronouncement is, simply expressed—let the League function in all its strength. If the League is impotent in grave crises the fault must be laid to the principal members of the League. This is the view very forcefully brought out by Mr. Vernon Bartlett. Writing in his July *World* on "European Hope or African Hell," he says:—

The dispute between Italy and Abyssinia will compel us to face a test of our honesty and courage far more severe than that presented to us by Japan when she occupied Manchuria

in 1931. Probably most people do not even now realise how manifold and disastrous have been the results of our failure to pass the Manchurian test. Until we are ruled, in international as in civil life, by a moral code which assures justice in spite of inclination, our own and other countries will be haunted by the constant fear of war. This doctrine that, in international affairs, a powerful nation must be allowed to conquer a weak one merely by reason of its superior power is so immoral that one should be ashamed to be a national of a state that accepted it. Moral principles must be the same, whether they are applied to individuals or to nations.

The remedy then is that the most influential members who practically guide the destinies of the League should remain true to their vows and commitments. They must begin, late though it is, to live in terms of true moral principles. As in the case of an individual who has resolved to turn a new leaf and to live aright and nobly, the past sins and misdemeanours of these great Powers will stand in their way. The finger of just criticism will be pointed at them, as it was recently by Italy at Great Britain; but as Mr. Bartlett shows the great Powers must nevertheless continue their efforts to act righteously. This will involve a purging and a purification of themselves; and in their own spheres of action, where they are free and unhampered, they must do so.

But is this true of the great Powers? Are their hands clean—not from the dirt of old sins, but from present-day greed and injustice? If the great Powers

failed in the Manchurian crisis, as Mr. Bartlett points out, it was because they were not guided by moral principles which work for the good of the world, but by self-interests.

The next pronouncement is from Sir Norman Angell, a man who has served Peace and Justice and whose views deserve respectful consideration. He also wants Great Britain to rise to her moral height and face Italy because of her own plighted word:—

Of course it is horrible and cruel to think that in certain extremely unlikely contingencies we might kill perfectly innocent Italian workers. It is horrible and cruel to take a forger or a murderer from his wife and children for half a lifetime and expose them, innocent though they be, to moral and material miseries. But no choice, presented by the complex problems of human society, ever is, as between a course which is completely fair and painless and one which is entirely evil. It is a moral certainty that in the end we should kill far more by not applying the Covenant than by letting Italy now know that in the event of her going to war with Abyssinia we shall take steps to secure the application of Articles 10, 12, 15, 16 and 20 of that Treaty of which we and she alike are signatories.

This is taken from the "Foreign Affairs Supplement" of the well-edited *Time and Tide*. With his usual insight and sense of justice Sir Norman adds:—

And of course our action should not be merely repressive. Italy, like other populous States, needs means of economic expansion. They are certainly not going to be realized by military adventure in Africa, by the creation of African nationalisms which can only

end by adding to the dangers that face every nation having interests in Africa. The only means by which States in the economic position of Italy can in the long run solve the problem of "space" is by the establishment of a code of economic right for all nations, a code of which the League must be the instrument. Abyssinia is prepared to accept technical help through the League in the Emperor's policy of modernization and development; and in that work and its results Italy would get her share. Far from it being true that a League of Nations is just the means by which the "saturated" powers resist the claims of the "unsatisfied," the economic internationalism of which the League should be the instrument is the only means by which the "unsatisfied" may find means of outlet that others will not resist. But the prelude to that positive and constructive work must be the assurance of defence by collective action.

Such a plan could succeed, but who will guide the nations "to live up to the ideals for which we declare we fought the last war?" Men like Mr. Bartlett and Sir Norman are not in power.

And that brings us to the fourth pronouncement:—

I believe that if there is to be any enduring peace, international measures must also be taken to improve the conditions of the masses. Prosperity for the entire body of humanity must take the place of hunger and oppression. The citizen of the world must be educated away from jealousy and greed and hate.

Mustapha Kemal spoke these words. The Ghazi who a few years ago taught a lesson to arrogant Europe and who has established his fame for valour and patriotism has more recently earned for himself, by arduous and

devoted service to his people, the title of Ataturk—the Father of the Turks. *The Hindu* of Madras (10th July) has reprinted an interview given by Kemal Ataturk to an Egyptian newspaper from which the above is an extract. Speaking of leaders he says:—

Some insincere leaders, who do not foresee the seriousness of war, have made themselves factors of aggression. Apparently they have deceived their nations by misrepresentations and abuse of nationalism and tradition. In order to avoid chaos in these critical hours the time has come for the masses to make their own decisions and place the responsibility of leadership in the hands of conscientious persons of excellent character and high morals, and this should be done as soon as possible.

But the masses, even when well educated lack wisdom to practise the moral principles which are known to them. Narrow nationalism in different forms has become the religion of people all over the world.

Out of his experience the great educator of some fourteen millions tells us that "the citizen of the world must be educated away from jealousy and greed and hate"—in other words, a purely moral and unsectarian education of the adult masses is the need of the hour. Neither the religious priests, nor the nationalistic politicians will respond to this need. To-day there is not a single cosmopolitan institution, strong and influential enough, to impress the idea and ideal of true Internationalism on the minds of the world. The League of

Nations is primarily a political body in which nationalistic Powers play their games and leave the League when it does not suit them. And yet it has within its constitution the potency to move the world in a righteous course.

As we do not believe in fatalism and as our Esoteric Philosophy teaches us to turn every power of evil to some good, we hold that it is never too late to abandon the wrong path and to adopt high, moral principles of life, individual or corporate. That Esoteric Philosophy teaches—

Nor would the ways of Karma be inscrutable were men to work in union and harmony, instead of disunion and strife. For our ignorance of those ways—which one portion of mankind calls the ways of Providence, dark and intricate; while another sees in them the action of blind Fatalism; and a third, simple chance, with neither gods nor devils to guide them—would surely disappear, if we would but attribute all these to their correct cause. With right knowledge, or at any rate with a confident conviction that our neighbours will no more work to hurt us than we would think of harming them, the two-thirds of the World's evil would vanish into thin air. Were no man to hurt his brother, Karma-Nemesis would have neither cause to work for, nor weapons to act through. . . . We stand bewildered before the mystery of our own making and the riddles of life that *we will not* solve, and then accuse the great Sphinx of devouring us. Begin acting from *within*, instead of ever following impulses from *without*. . . . The only palliative to the evils of life is union and harmony—a Brotherhood IN ACTU, and *altruism* not simply in name.

THE SONG OF THE HIGHER LIFE

I. THE GENERAL SETTING

[Below we publish the first of a series of essays founded on the great text-book of Practical Occultism, the *Bhagavad-Gita*. Each of these will discuss a title of one of the eighteen chapters of the Song Celestial. The writer calls them "Notes on the Chapter Titles of the Gita"—but they are more than notes. They bring a practical message born of study and experience.

Sri Krishna Prem is the name taken in the old traditional manner prevailing in India by a young English gentleman when he resolved to enter the Path of Vairagya, renouncing his all, including the name given to him at birth. He took his tripos at Cambridge in Mental and Moral Sciences and is a deep student of Indian philosophy. Away from the world but serving it with faith he lives in the Himālayas, and is esteemed highly for his sincerity, earnestness and devotion.—EDS.]

Before starting to discuss the *Gita* itself it will be desirable to say a few words about its setting, namely, the events recorded in the *Mahābhārata* which serve as the framework of the *Gita*. I am quite aware that many western scholars consider that the *Gita* was not a part of the original *Mahābhārata* but as most of them have yet to show any real understanding of either, I do not propose to discuss their views and will simply point out with Telang that the *Gita* has been introduced into its setting in a perfectly harmonious manner and, further, that a consideration of the events related in the *Mahābhārata* can easily shed considerable light upon the inner meaning of the *Gita*.

For the sake of western readers I will very briefly recount those events.

The Divinely born Arjuna with his four brothers was brought up with his cousins, the Kauravas, at the court of the latter's father

Dhritarāshtra, the king who, though disqualified by his blindness, had seized and held the throne. Not content with seizing the throne, the old king did not even hold the balance evenly between his sons and their cousins, the Pāṇdavas, but constantly favoured the former. Hostility soon developed between the two parties and, after a brief attempt to divide the realm between them, the Pāṇdavas were defeated at dice by trickery and made to wander for twelve long years in exile followed by a thirteenth year in which their very whereabouts had to remain unknown. At the conclusion of this period the well-meaning but weak king found it impossible to persuade his headstrong and evil minded son Duryodhana to restore to the Pāṇdavas their share of the kingdom and in spite of fruitless attempts to bring about a reconciliation by Sañjaya, Dhritarāshtra's charioteer, by Bhishma, his wise

counsellor, and even by the Lord Krishna Himself, war could not be averted and the rival hosts faced each other on the field of Kurukshetra. It is at this point that the *Gita* commences.

Without going into the question as to whether all the incidents of the *Mahābhārata* have a symbolic significance and whether it is possible to trace a consistent symbolism all through the vast epic, it must be clear to all who have eyes that there is an inner significance behind the events thus inadequately summarised. There is no need to ask the question whether the author of the *Mahābhārata* had such a symbolism consciously in his mind. Many, perhaps most, great works of art are filled with symbolism that is often quite unplanned by the conscious minds of their creators and sometimes this symbolism is truer and more profound from the fact of its having descended from a region beyond the realm of conscious thinking. It embodies, not the head-knowledge but the soul-knowledge of the artist. If it were not so then we should have to concur in Plato's rejection of art as being but the shadow of a shadow.

Porphry, the great Neoplatonist mystic, successfully demonstrated what a wealth of symbolism existed in the epics of Homer. It is true that most modern scholars reject all such interpretations as a mere reading into the texts of meanings that were never intended by the author but such a view is entirely

superficial and is based on an utter ignorance of the nature of great art which is always symbolic because it takes its birth in a realm whose only utterance is in symbol. If this is true of such a poem as the *Odyssey*, far more is it true of the *Mahābhārata*, a poem in which all the culture, all the aspirations and all the traditions of an entire race found expression. Symbolism is, in fact, like beauty itself: either you see it or you do not. And if it is seen then it is as irrelevant to enquire whether it was consciously intended by the author as it is to ask whether the beauty was consciously intended by him. It exists.

The skeleton interpretation which I shall indicate does not base itself (except in one point) upon the authority of scriptural texts nor does it depend for its validity on anyone's ability to fit every event in the poem into the framework of this scheme. That may or may not be possible and in any case is outside the scope of these notes. Whatever value it may have for any reader will depend entirely on the light that it may succeed in throwing on the teachings of the *Gita* for him. I may also add that no claim is made that these thoughts are original. Anyone who considers that they belong to him is welcome to take possession of them.

In the first place we should notice that, though not the eldest, the chief of the Pāṇdava brothers is Arjuna. He it was who won Draupadi at the *Swayamvara*,* and

* It was a custom in ancient India for princesses and daughters of kshatriyas to elect their husbands at a public assembly of suitors (called *Swayamvara*) held for that purpose.—EDS.

it was he alone whom she really loved and he who was the hero of the greatest exploits. Yudhishtira may excel in dharma and Bhima in feats of strength but it is on Arjuna's heroic prowess that the Pāṇdavas depend and it was Arjuna who went to Kailāsa to get the magic weapons from Mahādeva Himself. It is Arjuna, again, who is the special friend of Sri Krishna and the latter confirms this view when, in the tenth chapter of the *Gita*, he proclaims Arjuna and not Yudhishtira as the chief of the Pāṇdavas (*Pāṇḍavānām Dhananjaya*).

In the *Srimat-Bhāgawata* it is Arjuna who goes with Krishna to the abode of the Purushottama and is addressed by the latter as a second Krishna (*ityādishtau bhagawata tau krishnau parameshthinā*) and, returning to the *Mahābhārata*, it is Arjuna who is seen in heaven with Krishna, "those two foremost of all beings," by Yudhishtira on the latter's arrival there.

Arjuna and Krishna, the inseparable friends, are in fact well known to represent Nara and Nārāyana, the human soul and the Divine Soul, jivātma and Paramātma. They are the two birds that are described in the Upanishad, the two birds, eternal friends, seated upon the same tree, the body, of whom one, the human soul, eats the fruits while the other, the Paramātma, is a silent witness. It is true that the terms Nara and Nārāyana are explained by a reference to the story of a dual incarnation of Deity in the form of

two Rishis, Nara and Nārāyana, who performed tapasya and are believed to be still so doing, in the Himālayas. But this story is itself symbolic. The word "rishi" means a seer and in truth the only seer is the Ātman. "That which sees through the eye but whom the eye sees not: That is Ātman." So says the Upanishad and this story of the two Rishis is a symbol of the dual soul, human and Divine incarnated in one body. It is significant that the very name of the place in which the two Rishis perform their austerities is Badri, the name of a tree bearing sweet fruits, thus bringing us back again to the Upanishadic birds who are seated on a tree which likewise bears sweet fruits (*swādu pip-palam*).

The significance of Arjuna and Krishna having thus been indicated, we must next enquire into that of his brothers and cousins. We shall see that in the sixteenth chapter of the *Gita*, Sri Krishna makes a division between two great tendencies or movements in creation which He terms the Daivi or Divine, and the Asuric or demonic. It is these two tendencies that are symbolised by Arjuna's brothers and by the hostile Kauravas respectively. Detailed treatment of these two forces will come in its proper place; it will be sufficient here to observe that the Asuric and Daivi creations, popularly identified with vices and virtues respectively, in reality signify the "outgoing" and "ingoin" forces elsewhere called "pravritti" and "nivritti," the forces which

tend to enmesh the soul deeper and deeper in matter and those which help and accompany it on its return journey to Spirit. It is evident that the popular identification of them with the vices and virtues is but a rough approximation to their true meaning and one on a much lower plane of thought than that of the *Gita*.

It should be further noted that the Kauravas and the Pāṇdavas are cousins. There is none of the ultimate dualism that has marred so much of Christian thought, no God and Devil standing as ultimate irreconcilables. The Daivi and Asuric forces both spring from the same Supreme Source and in the end, both return to It.

It is not necessary to go into the question of the significance of the individual Pāṇdavas (except of course Arjuna who has already been dealt with) or Kauravas. The only other figures we shall discuss are Dhritarāshtra, the blind old king, and Sañjaya, his charioteer. These two are of some importance as they figure directly in the *Gita*.

The teachings of the *Gita* are spoken by Krishna who is acting as the charioteer of Arjuna; they are overheard by Sañjaya as a result of the blessing of Vyāsa, the author of the Scriptures and who signifies the power of inspiration, and they are repeated to Dhritarāshtra. This is the framework in which the teachings of the *Gita*

are set. Who are these persons and what is the significance of the two charioteers?

Krishna, we have seen is the Divine Soul who imparts the life-giving Wisdom to the individual soul. The metaphor of the Charioteer is one that occurs in the Upanishads and also in the Dialogues of Plato. In the Upanishads the individual soul is described as the rider in the chariot of the body while "buddhi" (a mental faculty that we shall have to discuss later) is the charioteer. In the *Gita*, however, the use to which the metaphor is put is slightly different. True, the individual soul in the form of Arjuna is still the rider in the chariot but the Charioteer is, as we have seen, the Divine Self in the person of Krishna.*

Dhritarāshtra, on the other hand, represents the empirical ego, the lower and transient personality which, blinded by egoism and foolish infatuation, wields a nominal sway over the kingdom of the body which it has unjustly seized, the word Dhritarāshtra meaning one who has seized the kingdom. Although he arrogates to himself the title of King, yet his rule over the kingdom is a merely nominal one for the real power lies with his Asuric sons just as the human personality which so proudly says "I" is the sport of a continual succession of involuntary desires and passions which are the real

* The difference between the *Gita* and the Upanishad in this matter is only apparent but it is not convenient to discuss the significance of it here though, to prevent misunderstanding, I should add that the human soul or jivātma referred to is the *angushtha-mātra purusha* or "person of the size of the thumb" which, divested of symbolism, is the Light of the One Ātman as reflected in the upādhi or vehicle of *Manas* (see Shwetāshwatara Upanishad 5.8). It is this that is the *dehi*, the ego which passes from life to life.

rulers of the body it calls its own.

Sañjaya, the charioteer and adviser of the blind king, is the link between the higher and lower minds. The mind has a dual status in Hindu Philosophy. "The mind is said to be two-fold, the pure and the impure; impure by union with desire, and pure, completely free from desire." (*Maitri Upanishad* 6. 34) The impure mind is Dhritarāshtra, the empirical ego controlled by desire (Duryodhana), while the pure mind is Arjuna, the individual soul, or rather the *upādhi* of that soul as indicated in the previous foot-note. Sañjaya is thus the link between the two. This link which in some teachings is termed *antahkarana* (though usually that word is used in a different sense) is, at least in one sense, the conscience, the mediator by which the Voice of the Higher is heard by the lower. Thus Sañjaya though, anchored in service to Dhritarāshtra, yet reaches out to a faith in Krishna and constantly counsels his master to abandon his weak egoism and submit himself to the latter. It is thus Sañjaya who, when aided by the inspiration derived from Vyāsa is able to "overhear" the dialogue between Krishna and Arjuna and so to form a link between the inner knowledge of the soul and the dark ignorance of the ego-centred personality.

It may also be said that there is a correspondence between these four characters and the four states of consciousness taught by Hindu philosophy, the

jagrata, swapna, sushupti and turiya usually translated, more by way of analogy than of identity, as the waking, dreaming, deep sleep and ecstatic states.

We are now in a position to return to the outline sketch of the events that have led up to the delivery of the *Gita*. The Soul, leaving behind its Divine ancestry, becomes attached to a personality and lives amidst the conflicting forces that make up this world. The conflict, at first latent as the Daivi and Asuric forces are not clearly differentiated, gradually increases in strength. Attempts at partition of their respective spheres of influence having failed, as indeed they must fail since all is one unity and action and reaction must necessarily take place, the Soul and its associates are deceived by the illusions of the Asuric or downward-tending forces and are condemned to long wanderings in the wilderness. During this period, a period which in reality extends through long ages, the Soul wanders about from birth to birth performing actions and reaping their fruits. Reduced to powerlessness as it is, it yet slowly gathers wisdom as a result of its manifold experiences and, though exposed to countless hardships and perils, it is yet saved from utter disaster by the unseen power of its Lord, the Divine Soul. Experience, wisdom and also powers are gained, for it is during this period that Arjuna gains his magical weapons that are later to be of such immense value to him. The Asuric forces rule the world un-

checked and at length the thirteenth year arrives, the year of *ajnāta wāsa* in which the very existence of the Soul and its brothers has to remain unknown.

It is the darkest hour, the hour before the dawn and the Soul, reduced to performing the tasks of a servant is lost to sight altogether. The forces of materialism seem triumphant and the very existence of the Soul becomes a matter of doubt or even denial.

But not for ever can the Soul be thus buried in darkness. The allotted period draws to its close and the Soul emerges from its obscurity with all its flashing powers. Significantly enough, the first event is a battle in defence of the right, the battle fought on behalf of king Virāta, in which the Soul, though still disguised, displays its prowess and puts to flight the Powers of the Dark. So decisive indeed is the Soul's intervention that none can stand against it. All are aware of the rising star and all foresee the terrible conflict that must now occur.

But the Soul seeks no autocratic power for itself. It is for its brothers, the dispossessed Daivi Sarga, that it is prepared to fight

and, even for them, it claims no undivided sway. Knowing, as it does, that the Asuric forces are as much a part of the cosmic play as are the Daivi ones, it proposes only a just division of the kingdom but this the Powers of the Dark will not grant.

Bhishma, the aged counsellor, the symbol of established Law and Order and Social tradition, foreseeing the disastrous conflict, pleads for peace and reconciliation as does Sañjaya, the mind. Sri Krishna Himself sets forth in persuasive words the advantages of harmonious peace but all is of no avail. Duryodhana refuses to listen and the old King professes himself powerless to control his headstrong sons. War is inevitable. The conflict of the Daivi and the Asuric can no longer be averted and the rival hosts face each other on the field of Kurukshetra.

It is at this fateful moment that the *Gita* commences. The opposing hosts are drawn up in battle array and the long expected conflict is about to commence.

Dhritarāshtra says:—"In the Holy Field of Kurukshetra what did they do, O Sañjaya, my sons and the Pāṇdavas, gathered together eager for battle?"

SRI KRISHNA PREM

THE FIELD OF SCIENCE

WANTED — SYNTHESISERS NOT SPECIALISTS

[The following article may be described as an indictment of men and methods of Science. "A Curator" is a European University "specialist" with wide American experience.—EDS.]

The disease of our civilization is lack of unity and co-ordination. Within a single nation classes are un-co-ordinated; nations are un-co-ordinated on a single continent; and continents are un-co-ordinated threatening a world-war. Lack of unity is the order of the day. That very disease has overtaken modern science: branches of science are no more on a single tree; they have fallen apart, thanks to the axes of the specialists. Unless a change takes place the cause of knowledge will suffer, its real progress be arrested.

Self-interest begets hypocrisy; politicians talk of brotherhood and prepare for war; scientists talk of knowledge having no frontiers, while specialists set limits to their frontiers; men of science compete among themselves, sell their knowledge in open market to the highest bidder, and in secrecy use it to serve the cause of war. Just as the task of real idealists is hampered by politicians, economists and bankers, so in the field of knowledge the task of the real seekers and servers of truth suffers through ambitious exploiters, pseudo-researchers and even posers. A single attendance at one of the congresses of men of science strikingly reveals how there is lack of co-ordination of knowledge while

specialists and pseudo-specialists read lengthy jargon.

The moral outlook of the men of science is a problem in itself; it affects the very advancement of knowledge. Fancies overpower facts, theories take the place of truths, and moral and ethical principles are not even taken into account. The curse of egotism, of separateness, is poisoning human relations, and competition and rivalry are corrupting the world of intellect.

The sin of separateness is working havoc as dangerously in pure and applied science as in other fields. It has become necessary, in the pursuit of knowledge, to demonstrate clearly, that one's opinion or one's explanation differs from that of one's co-workers so as to avoid the stamp of inferiority upon oneself. This is the only way to insure a successful career, or even a simple living. The scientific value of a man is appraised mainly on the basis of his "originality," and little account is taken of his character, provided he does not transgress the letter of the law. No one will deny that in a certain sense each man is, and must be, "original," inasmuch as "each man is a law unto himself." But the world is still a long way from realizing the spiritual aspect

of this law. What do we mean when we speak of "originality?" Do we not encourage the immoral tendency in man to use his own powers and faculties at the expense of others and for personal benefit?

The whole trend of our western civilization is to encourage, nay, to force a man who is obliged to earn a living in the field of science to pose as different and separate from his neighbour. He must, if possible, appear to be of greater value, as having opened up new lines of thought, having created new problems to solve, etc.; in short, he must cause talk and receive the *imprimatur* of an original thinker, an original investigator, an original something.

For this publicity is the means. This is why our world is glutted with an overwhelming mass of printed matter dealing with speculations on almost every known subject. This flood has risen so high that it threatens to drown all activity. The current literature on any specific topic is so enormous that the yearly output is more than any man could digest, even supposing he devoted himself to the task with assiduity.

This mad rush to publicise one's "originality" has two results:

The first is specialization. We are not condemning division of labour in the intellectual field, particularly in applied science. Quite the contrary. There is need for it, but the touch with the living centre of which each radius is but a special expression should not be lost. We cannot but condemn the

specialization which transforms a man, into one "who knows more and more about less and less"; Then there is the other aspect in the words of Professor Bennett of Yale University:—

The specialist sees the criminal hormone and not the offender, the intelligent quotient not the child, the tonsil not the patient, the metre not the poem.

This kind of specialization results from a desire to be "original." It furnishes pleasing occupation for minds which are not great, and what is worse, provides them with an opportunity to influence current thought in a manner which in many cases is far from harmless. Our crying need at present is for deep, all-embracing minds—synthesisers, not specialists. Synthesisers and not specialists will be able to cure the ignorance of our men of learning.

The second: these speculations are published as facts, and that in itself militates against the very foundation-principles of modern science. The spirit of competition leads to unceasing activity and leaves no time to properly check, test and verify the accumulating material. Such a situation can but threaten the entire scientific structure. Each man is so immersed in his own little sub-department, that he finds no time to even consider its relation to the whole. There may be sad awakenings in the near future in consequence of this.

The field of scientific knowledge may be compared to a circle with an ever-expanding circumference. The duty of science is to continual-

ly forward this expansion; but it must be an all-round expansion, not a lop-sided one. Is this the existing situation?

And what about the aims of scientists? Some members of our profession declare that they do not care as long as it gives them an opportunity to make a living. Such men are at least honest; though they are of little value to the cause of real progress. Others state that their aim is to discover truth; but among them are those who deceive themselves, their real motive being personal ambition. And the method of us all? We depend on the sensorium to contact the realities which lie behind. The banishment of religion from the field of research has been beneficial; but absence of philosophy has been detrimental and has contributed to the non-co-ordination of the various branches of science. By present methods we can formulate sub-laws of Nature, but what is behind must remain a secret. To contact the noumenal

Law behind the phenomenal effects with sense instruments is as profitable a pursuit as to determine a man's honesty by the use of a magnifying glass. Our method is one of chasing beautiful butterflies—methodless.

Physical science has been proceeding in a desultory fashion. The result is lop-sided. Observations, speculations and theories have accumulated. A period of reflection seems more than due. Shifting of evidence has become an imperative necessity; co-ordinating of facts can follow the rejection of mere theories, views and opinions. I submit that established facts are submerged in the heap of theories which when co-ordinated would redound to the glory of modern science. The rejection of fancies and co-ordination of facts will remove an obstacle from the ways of science; but where are the leaders who will chase the money-changers out of the temple of science?

A CURATOR

In the above article a man of science recognizes that philosophy possesses the power to co-ordinate different branches of science. Perhaps the writer had in mind the words of Herbert Spencer in *First Principles*: "Knowledge of the lowest kind is *ununified* knowledge; Science is *partially unified* knowledge; Philosophy is *completely unified* knowledge." But can we really say that modern philosophy offers completely unified knowledge?

The preceding article directly points out the flaws of science; the following indirectly reveals how weak is the position of modern philosophy.—EDS.

PHILOSOPHY

"A REVITALIZING REFUGE"

[Dr. Michael Kaye is the author of *Human Welfare—The Social and Educational Essentials*. His contribution is a defence of philosophy and in these days when among all branches of knowledge, science is receiving greatest attention it does become necessary to champion the cause of Fair Philosophy. According to Plato "those who are able to grasp the eternal and the immutable" are philosophers, lovers of wisdom. And the objects of their devotion? They "set their affections on that which in each case really exists." To-day the superficial attracts, and to feel a thrill is to live; so even a little study of true philosophy may prove a boon and a blessing. But what is true philosophy?—a luxury of the mind, which it is now, or a necessity of the Soul whose very existence is doubted and questioned?—EDS.]

Philosophy has natural roots; it does not make its questions; it finds them. It is not an artificial product of the academy; it is not a matter of arbitrary definition; it springs from reflections which are commonplace. How did the world commence? And how will it end? But did it commence, and will it end? And is it infinite or bounded? But is it in space at all; may not space be for the mind which thinks it, and mind itself be the world? Yet further, may there not be many worlds? And in any case, how can the world or the worlds, be known? And even if the possibility of such knowledge be granted, how will it help us to know what to do, and will it fortify in us the salutary conviction that what we cherish most will certainly be ours?

These are questions which the more thoughtful of men ask spontaneously. Faced with tremendous beauty—of ocean or landscape—we wonder as to the beauty of the world. In our moments of love and achievement we rebel

at the notion that these things may not last. And if we would enjoy the world in a vision, and think it without self-contradiction, we demand as our right that reality should be comprehensible and rational. What, then, of the ugliness and cruelty with which for some of us the world seems so lavish? These qualities, also, we may impute as what is most characteristic and essential to the world as a whole, and, as to ourselves, we may, like Job, curse the day that we were born. But also, we may distinguish between appearance and reality; and having indulged in self-pity as the mere puppets of universal power, we may proceed to wonder whether precisely this power is not the profoundest reality of ourselves.

It is from such questions and surmises as these—which are put in all simplicity by even the more thoughtful of adolescents—that philosophy derives, and which, if it is to remain itself, philosophy in its advancing subtlety needs constantly to remember. For philosophy

is not in its essence mere analysis—however persistent, penetrating, and many-sided; it is dependent on, but is not identical with, logic, linguistic, and epistemology; its originative and abiding aim is definitely by thought to reveal the world; its heart and soul is metaphysics.

But though philosophy may arise in the market place, it is seldom allowed to remain and flourish there. For the most part, philosophical questions are merely felt. But even if their articulation is explicit and clear, they are generally swept away by the succession of our daily cares. For ordinarily we are held in grip by the noise and colour of our perceptions, and are pushed on by our inner appetites. We have to earn our living; we have to maintain our families; we cannot afford to become neglectful of our hurried routine. And then we would eat and drink and be merry, prattle and travel and luxuriate in our self-magnified self-assertions. We want above all to *live*—by which it is generally meant to live sensationally: and for material enjoyment there is generally required material struggle. No wonder, then, that there should be little time left for philosophy.

Moreover, even if we be determined to persist with our philosophical questions till they shall have obtained a definite answer, we may still acquiesce in a solution which is not itself philosophical. For we may achieve conviction through what we see in a flash, intuitively. Or we may feel the

answer in our blood. Or we may accept without challenge whatsoever is stated by what we compulsively or gladly acknowledge as dogmatic authority. In any case, whether because we are impatient with thought as something slow, laborious, inconclusive, and futile, or because we fear thought as a paralysing solvent, it is exceptional that we should require explicitly intellectual solutions as indispensable to our ordinary life and satisfaction.

Thus, its common origin notwithstanding, philosophy in its fullest flight we may expect to be esoteric. The questions which start it off are sufficiently familiar, and commonly spontaneous; but its intellectual methods of attempting to resolve these questions, these to the popular view are alien, tedious, and unpalatable. Of course, the philosopher is not a thinker merely; he requires feeling, imagination, intuitive leaps and insights, for his greatness. This, which has been urged by Bertrand Russell in his *Mysticism and Logic*, is evident among such giants as Plato, Spinoza, Bradley, McTaggart and Whitehead. But it is also evident from these writers that the philosopher is a thinker primarily—nor is this contradicted by the actual argumentation even of Bergson, notwithstanding that for the final discovery of reality he would have argument yield to intuition, philosophy give place to mysticism. Thus we may quarrel with much of modern philosophical analysis for sometimes seeming to forget its ultimate metaphysical

purpose; but we must always remember that Plato speaks of philosophy as Dialectic, and that Spinoza sets out his philosophy as though it were a chain of propositions and proofs in geometry. Whatever, then, a man's anxiety to reach to the heart of things, unless he is passionately an intellectual he cannot be a philosopher. Could man see the world all at once, he might rightly regard philosophy as superfluous. But as man is not capable of an instantaneous synopsis he needs philosophy. If he is to obtain any universal insight which shall be satisfactory to his nature as a whole, it is the assumption of philosophy that, whatever else he needs to do, he must proceed patiently and consecutively by way of an ever self-accumulating synthesis of analytical references and inferences.

Is the value of philosophy limited to those who are philosophical from the first? Is it inadvisable to attempt the development of philosophic desire in the multitudes who are originally indifferent and even hostile to it? It might clearly be biologically and socially dangerous to stimulate desire beyond capacity. Nevertheless, that the masses should be encouraged to love and pursue philosophy to the degree that it is actually within their power, might appear generally advantageous.

For while a science has an interest in reality which is partial, and often a scientist seems devoted to rigorous and exact thought, and to a scrupulous regard for the

available evidence, only in the field of his special research, there is unquestionably the allegiance of philosophy to truth universal. Hence there is such a thing as a philosophic mind, which, applicable to each detail of experience, may function as a supreme control both for private aspiration and activity, and in the diversities and difficulties of social intercourse.

Yet aware that the attainment of truth is difficult, the philosopher acquires, and seeks to spread, the attitude of tolerance. Because certain beliefs, even though not demonstrably true, yet seem indubitably to "work"—to help man to control the world and himself, and to obtain health and happiness—the philosopher, though careful to avoid the pragmatist's error of identifying the "useful" with the "true," still considers it fitting to treat the doubtful, and even the apparently absurd, with varying degrees of respect. Therefore he will not oppose "fanaticism" which is productive and beneficent, for he appreciates how faith is a drive to action, and that he himself has no certain truth to put in its place. Yet precisely the rarity and even the impossibility of certain truth he will employ as a challenge to all such fanaticism as is selfish, destructive, and inimical. To the latter, it is the philosopher himself who will exclaim: "There are more things in heaven and earth, than are dreamt of in your philosophy." Wherefore the philosophic devotion to difficult truth, far from depressing and paralysing

action, should rather help it to fructify in an atmosphere of forbearance and peace by spreading that tolerance which is born of intellectual bafflement.

But further, the popular conception of the philosopher as stoically acquiescent is not mistaken utterly. For as he concentrates his reflection on the nature of the entirety of the world, it is to be expected that he should lose much of his primitive concern with the welfare of his own particularity. Nor is it simply that, as a philosophic pluralist, he may, like the scientist and the artist, gain through the "purest objectivity" a pacifying obliviousness of the subjective. It is that he can enhance his subjectivity, and may even discover it as in a manner immortal, according as he discern with Spinoza its inseparability from the permanent reality of the whole. Thus in this way also philosophy may fortify action now by promoting a certain poise in the face of crisis. And the philosopher may retain this derivative stability even though he should think it immodest to venture further, and to presume with Plato that Reality, being not merely inevitable, but inevitable perfection, has the power to invest its thinkers with a degree of its own nobility.

Finally, like the creation and contemplation of beauty, and the beneficence of morality, philosophy is an activity good in itself; not different in this respect from the scientific quest, it can yield a large satisfaction not merely by its instrumentality, nor yet only by its achievements, but as a pursuit which is a way of life. Emphatically, then, philosophy may not purchase any "escape from reality" by obfuscation and delusion, by any such harmony, simplicity, and neatness as are merely æsthetic and soporific, and an insult to the demand for comprehensiveness. Yet it is not to be disloyal intellectually to quit the storm in order to observe it; the spectator of the whole may possess more of the truth than the player of a part. And it is thus that philosophy, by the quality of its ratiocination, as also by the grandeur of its postulated objective, may function, compatibly with its fundamental principle, as a revitalising refuge from what is mean, petty and odious.

But if philosophy can do so much, we may not merely regret the difficulty, even for the most zealous of its devotees, of being philosophical unswervingly; we may with reason desire its cultivation by as many as possible.

MICHAEL KAYE

In the above article the writer emphasises mind-process as necessary for the pursuit of philosophy. But now measure the strength of a just attack upon Reason which follows.—EDS.

THE FACULTY OF REASON

"A STAFF BUT NOT A SIGN POST"

[J. D. Beresford delivers a reasoned attack on the faculty so highly prized—Reason. Both in modern science and in modern philosophy mind is regarded as man's highest faculty. In the western world mysticism is not a definite system following which a man may prove to himself that human consciousness has layers which transcend the reasoning faculty. In books on Asiatic Psychology both theory and practice of *Yoga* are outlined, and one of the primary lessons imparted is that the mind is the slayer of the real, that the disciple shall slay the slayer. *The Voice of the Silence* from which Mr. Beresford quotes is one of those books and—most reliable.—EDS.]

The intellectual world of to-day can still be ranged in the two broad philosophical categories of materialism and idealism. The first group is less militant than it once was. The fervent agnostics of the second half of the nineteenth century, the men who had discovered with an effect of immense relief that all religion was nothing more than formalised superstition and that God was a myth, have few important successors at the present time. H. G. Wells still seeking to inculcate those admirable principles of his for the betterment of social conditions, continues to imply that mankind need hope for no heaven other than that he may make for himself on this earth. Mr. Julian Huxley influenced by his study of that most materialistic of sciences, biology, is inclined to air his agnosticism on occasion. But unless we can count Bertrand Russell as an active opponent of inspired religion, there is no other name in this group that can rank with those that seemed to be fighting a winning battle for materialism a generation ago.

On the other side, however, there is, among our finest scientific intellects, none who is prepared to champion openly the case for the spiritual origin and destiny of mankind. Sir Arthur Eddington is unquestionably on that side. In his last book, *New Pathways in Science*, he says boldly: "I assert that the nature of all reality is spiritual, not material nor a dualism of matter and spirit." But his study is mathematical physics and he is not concerned to enter into a philosophical defence of his position. We may infer from various evidence that the general tendency of modern science is towards an idealistic theory of the universe, a theory that would have found few supporters in the Royal Society—and even then for entirely different reasons—forty years ago. But we are apparently still far from the time, when a spiritual conception of the universe will be accepted as the basis of all scientific teaching.

The truth is that most of our great thinkers in this connection have been and still are careless of what they may regard as a ques-

tion of no present importance. They have been fascinated by the endless mysteries of the material world and found that the attempt to solve any one of them has provided more than sufficient occupation for a lifetime. The study of science means specialisation, and those who specialise become too confined by their concentration upon one aspect of material phenomena, to be capable of the synthesis necessary to seek a single cause behind all effects. Wherefore the representative scientific mind almost always becomes completely materialistic or unthinkingly adopts a provisional idealism as some kind of working hypothesis.

This problem has been much in my mind lately because I have been constantly thinking of the part that reason plays in the human complex. I came to that by the realisation that in the strange phenomena presented by what we call "spiritual healing" the intellect is a persistent bar to the performance of anything in the nature of a "miracle." (I use the familiar but misrepresentative phraseology to save an unnecessary digression.) From that I came inevitably to the broader consideration that occupied Immanuel Kant's logical mind more than a century and a half ago; and it seems to me that, in the light of the new knowledge that has come to us in the course of those years, a re-statement of the main principle may be of value at a time when the whole trend of thought is towards a spiritual explanation

of the universe.

The question we have to consider is the function of reason, and we may approach it in the first place from a psychological standpoint, taking an instance from the subject of a post-hypnotic suggestion. A common experiment in this relation is to command a subject in deep hypnotic trance to say some word, perform some action or it may be give the answer to an arithmetical sum, at a certain time, it may be twenty-four hours or more, after the return to his or her normal condition. This experiment has been successfully performed so often that it is accepted as one of the proved phenomena of hypnotic suggestion. But the only interesting aspect of it from our present point of view is that the subject, having obeyed the apparently irrational command of the subconscious will always, if questioned, invent a specious excuse for the sudden interjection of a startling irrelevancy. Thus, to make the instance clear, a woman having been given an arithmetical sum to do while in deep trance was ordered to return the answer to it at her next meeting with the hypnotist, the following day. This she did, greeting him at his entrance by saying "Five," the correct answer. When asked why she had given him such a strange greeting, she instantly replied that she had been thinking of her family and that they had been five in number.

Now we may find in this example a model of the general function of the reasoning faculty in man,

What we observe is that the intelligence has a highly developed capacity first to accept suggestions rising from the subconscious and subsequently to rationalise them, that is to account for them in terms of its own intellectual knowledge. We witness the same process in the child, who attempts to justify a false statement or the account of an imaginative experience affirmed to be a real happening, by some ingenious though generally unacceptable invention. We see it, also, in the experience of dreams, when we accept as fact what is by the standards of waking life, the most absurd improbability, and then continue the dream-story on that basis. Also, it must be remembered that the same process forms the foundation of logic. To construct a syllogism we have to take a major and a minor premise and the reasoning power cannot be exercised in relation to the syllogism until the premises have been stated. In short, to summarise this aspect of the problem, the reasoning function is of its very nature a secondary process and the direction taken by it, whether towards idealism or realism, is always influenced by the material upon which it is exercised.

Our next step is to consider whence this material is derived. There can be but two sources for the premises upon which we base our philosophy, one objective and the other subjective, and as has already been intimated the scientist accepts the former only as a safe guide to knowledge. He takes

as his premise the phenomena of the objective world, and arguing from effect to cause, seeks first to infer and then to enunciate various natural laws, or in other words to demonstrate that like causes will invariably produce like effects. Thus the laws of Newton, as modified now by Einstein's theory of Relativity, will enable the astronomer to foretell with a remarkable degree of accuracy the movements of the planets during, say, the next hundred years.

Now achievements such as the one cited once encouraged the scientist's hope that in the course of time, every natural law would be understood and the riddle of the universe successfully solved possibly on some bio-chemical hypothesis that would cover the intensely puzzling factors of life, consciousness and free-will. That expectation, however, is far more remote at the present time than it was at the end of the last century. The further science has penetrated, and in some directions it has gone exceedingly deep, the more evident it has become that *there remain always various puzzling exceptions to natural law, which cannot be covered by the general theory*. Indeed, in mathematical physics it has been found necessary to abandon the theory of any absolute relation between cause and effect and substitute the principle of probability.

Wherefore, returning to the main argument, we are justified in stating that any philosophy based solely on objective premises, that is to say upon the result of observation and experiment conducted in

relation to material phenomena, cannot be valid unless it is able to embrace all those phenomena in their entirety. The biologist can never claim to have solved the riddle of the universe unless his conclusions embrace the findings of the physicist, and *vice versa*; or to revert to our logical terms, the argument from observation and experiment cannot pretend to give an explanation of the universal unless it is based on premises that cover every aspect of the universe by the demonstration of laws sufficient to account for all the phenomena.

What, then, of the other, the subjective source that provides material for the exercise of this secondary function of reason? In the first place, however unacceptable the fact may be to the realist, this subjective source is solely responsible for his philosophy. That and that alone accounts for his tendency to select certain premises from the universal content, and to reject, or even become blind to all those other premises that are incompatible with them. It represents his natural bias in this or that direction, the fundamental basis of his character, and will determine in nearly every case his personal solution of the riddle of the universe. And should the realist admit this but claim that this inherent disposition of his is due to an adventitious arrangement of brain-cells, he will thereby establish the truth of my main contention that the reason is a fallible, untrustworthy instrument. For how shall a man hope to find

truth by the exercise of his intelligence if its single instrument, the reason, is dependent for its working on the suggestions, provided by a particular arrangement of what the physiologist would describe as "the pyramidal cells of the supra-granular cortex?"

I have now reached the critical stage of a purely logical argument at which I seem to have thrown doubt upon the very method I have employed. I have in fact employed reason in order to prove that reason is untrustworthy. But I can plead justification, for this is not truly a paradox. What I have said has been adduced not to discredit either the power or the uses of the intellect. The reasoning faculty has reached a stage of very high development in man, and is an invaluable guide to material life. *All that I claim in my attack upon reason is that it must always fail to give a true account of the universe so long as it is confined to the premises provided by objective presentation.* Reason provides an admirable staff, but it cannot be used, also, as a signpost. As we read in *The Voice of the Silence*: "Even ignorance is better than Head-learning with no Soul-wisdom to illuminate and guide it."

It may seem to readers of THE ARYAN PATH, that I have gone a long way round in order to arrive at a conclusion which they have already accepted. But it may be well to remember now and again, how many fine intellects there are in the world to-day which cannot approach any discussion on the nature of the first cause, except

by the employment of their own method. Wherefore it has been borne in upon me, more and more of recent years that if any answer is to be found to the materialists, it must be given in their own language and the battle fought upon their own ground. In this article, I have been handicapped by the need for condensation. There are many points upon which I have been unable to touch. But speaking as one who in the first instance has come to the beliefs I now hold, chiefly by the exercise of thought and contemplation, I know for certain that mind's in-

tellectual conviction must precede the search for Soul Wisdom. How that is to be found when the seat of reason is discovered to be not a throne but a footstool, is clearly indicated in a further quotation from *The Voice of the Silence*, a quotation that might have served me for a text:—

Shun ignorance, and likewise shun illusion. Avert thy face from world deceptions: mistrust thy senses; they are false. But within thy body—the shrine of thy sensations—seek in the Impersonal for the "Eternal Man"; and having sought him out, look inward: thou art Buddha.

J. D. BERESFORD

Only those who realise how far Intuition soars above the tardy processes of ratiocinative thought can form the faintest conception of that absolute Wisdom which transcends the ideas of Time and Space. Mind, as we know it, is resolvable into states of consciousness, of varying duration, intensity, complexity, etc.—all, in the ultimate, resting on sensation, which is again Maya. Sensation, again, necessarily postulates limitation.

H. P. BLAVATSKY, *The Secret Doctrine* I, pp. 1-2.

ANCIENT AND HONOURABLE INDIA

[The mystical and philosophical achievements of hoary India are very well-known. It is not equally well-known, however, that Hindus of antiquity built social and political structures of a very high order. The following two articles point to these achievements.

Dr. Radhakumud Mookerji, the famous historian gives a bird's-eye view of the wonderful accomplishments of the ancient Hindus. Supplementing it a second article shows how they grappled with a problem which puzzles in our age—the relation between capital and labour. It is written by **S. V. Viswanatha M. A.** whose contribution on "The Citizen and the State—The Indian View," appeared in our March issue.—EDS.]

I.—A GLIMPSE INTO EARLY CIVILIZATION

Recent archæological discoveries tend towards the conclusion that after all India may have been the very cradle of the human race and of its culture. The earliest civilization was the product of rivers like the Nile, the Euphrates, or the Tigris to which are now to be added the Indus, the Jamuna and the Ganges. The antiquities unearthed at Harappa, Mohenjo-daro and other sites show that India also had developed a civilisation as early as Egyptian, Proto-Elamite or Sumerian. The recent finds at Buxar, at depths of more than 50 ft. indicate that this civilisation might have originated in the valley of the Ganges.

India is supposed by many students of Biological Evolution to have been the cradle of the race itself. According to the geologist Borell, "Man and the Himalayas arose simultaneously towards the end of the Miocene Period, over a million years ago."

India's earliest civilisation is

best seen in the remains found at Mohenjo-daro and Harappa. Its age is determined by the fact that definitely Indian objects are found in the *earliest* strata at Elamite, Mesopotamia and Iraq sites, e.g., seals bearing the Indus script and the Indian humped bull. Seals bearing the figures of the Indian animals, elephant and rhinoceros, which were foreign to Babylon are found at Babylonian sites in layers which are definitely dated as they bear inscriptions of an Akkad King of about 2500 B. C. Such objects, however, are found at Mohenjo-daro in some of its later layers. The Indus civilisation may thus safely be dated from about 4000 B. C.*

What were the achievements of this civilisation? Its materials included stone, copper, and bronze, but not iron. It is thus chalcolithic, following the two stone Ages, Palæolithic and Neolithic. But its makers were pioneers and very advanced in other matters. They

were the first builders of an urban civilisation, the first in the world in town-planning, sanitary engineering (by construction of open and covered drains), in architecture in stone and burnt brick as a measure of protection against floods to which the city was exposed. They were also pioneers in several industries. They grew the first wheat and the first barley. They were the first to spin and weave in both wool and cotton. The cotton they used 5000 years back is judged to be the ancestor of modern Indian cotton with its typical convoluted structure. They used the first cart in the world. Their glazed Indus pottery is considered to be the earliest in the world. They developed a method of writing. They carried on trade with distant countries. Their gold came from Kolar and Anantapur; copper and tin from Persia; yellow stone from Jaisalmer; green stone from Doddabetta in the Nilgiris; lapis lazuli from Badakshan, turquoise from Khorasan and jadeite from Turkestan and Tibet. They made jewellery and ornaments out of precious stones and metals. They domesticated animals like the cow, camel or elephant and hunted down wild animals like the tiger, rhino or boar, which were the denizens of forests then flourishing in Sindh, for Sindh was then well-watered.

But the civilisation was not merely material. It was marked by progress in thought. It achieved real Art in the modelling of forms of both animals and man.

It produced in bronze, figures of dancing girls which appeal to modern taste. It produced the first figure of a Yogi in meditation, with his eyes fixed on the tip of the nose. It also evolved the figures of deities, like the primeval Mother-Goddess, Siva, Sakti; of trees (anticipating the Bodhi-Tree, Tree of Knowledge) and of the animals worshipped as the Vahanas or vehicles of the deities. In these we find the roots of later popular Hinduism, as in *Yoga* the link with higher Hinduism. *Yoga* in fact is the one supreme characteristic of Hinduism in all its periods from the Vedic downwards and in all its phases and forms, Brahmanical, Buddhist and Jain.

Racially, the builders of this civilisation are supposed by anthropologists to have been a mixed people of Mediterraneans (dolichocephalic, long-headed) and Armenoids (brachycephalic, broad-headed), immigrants from the west, who built up the earliest civilisation in Mesopotamia, spoke Dravidian, and used a pictographic script.

This vast and advanced non-Aryan civilisation was confronted by the Aryans who were the real makers of India and her history. Their national work, the *Rigveda*, is the earliest book of humanity. It tells of the non-Aryan and his civilisation in words which may be read in stone, brick and mortar at Harappa and Mohenjo-daro. The Aryan in the *Rigveda* refers to his non-Aryan brethren with respect. He tells of their architecture, and forts, and pillars of stone, and of free alliance with the Aryans in

* Our reader's attention may be drawn to an article by Professor S. Venkateswara in THE ARYAN PATH for April 1931 on "Vedic Chronology—A Case for 11,000 B. C."—EDS.

the conflicts of the times. The Battle of the Ten Kings (Dāśarājā) against Sudās was a battle in which the Aryan fought shoulder to shoulder with the non-Aryan in a common cause. Some scholars have gone so far as to hold that the differences between the Aryan and the non-Aryan in the *Rigveda* are merely cultural. But the *Rigveda* has passages describing the non-Aryan as *anāsa*, "snub-nosed," *Krishna-garbha*, "of black brood" and *mridhravak*, "of strange speech" (a non-Aryan tongue) and such descriptions recall the proto-Australoids forming the original elements in the Indian population.

The Aryan civilisation gradually spread all over India, practically assimilating the non-Aryan civilisation or absorbing its chief features. Its social system, its elasticity and comprehensiveness did not exclude the non-Aryan for whom it found a place.

Its pristine features are revealed in Vedic Literature made up of the four Vedic Samhitas, Brāhmaṇas, Upanishads, and Āraṇyakas, and later, in the Sūtra, and Śāstra or Smṛiti works.

In one word, it may be designated as Varṇāśrama-Dharma, the system based on division of society into four castes, and of life into four stages. The four castes are those of Brāhmaṇa, Kshatriya, Vaiśya, and Sūdra with defined functions. Normally, the Brāhmaṇa is the custodian of the community's culture, its spiritual wealth and interests, the Kshatriya of its defence, the Vaiśya of its material wealth or economic interest, and

the Sūdra of its requirements in personal service. The four stages of life are those of the Student, the Householder, the Mendicant, and the Hermit, in a process of progressive self-realisation by which Life can conquer Death.

These divisions mark only the externals of the system, but not its inner content which is free of restrictions. Social life and organisation must rest upon some sort of division and distribution of functions. But all are equal in the Kingdom of the spirit.

Thus the Upanishads admit Satya-Kāma Jābāla to the highest knowledge, irrespective of his caste, and in spite of his uncertain parentage, simply on the ground of merit. They are equally decisive in condemning the religion that is confined merely to rituals and sacrifice, and branding even the Vedas as inferior knowledge, *aparā vidyā*, as distinguished from the *parā vidyā*, the highest knowledge, which is the knowledge of the Ātman as the sole and ultimate Reality. The way to this highest knowledge which is dismissed in the West as the unknown and unknowable is discovered in the Vedas to lie through *tapas*, a course of mortification of the flesh so that its suggestion may not disturb meditation on the Ātman or the Absolute. This course of *tapas* or penance is a course of regulated asceticism which beginning in *brahmacharya* or studentship is carried on into the householder's state until it ends in renunciation of the world in the last two stations of life. The best

exponent of this system is Rishi Yājñavalkya who explains to his royal pupil, Janaka of Videha, that to attain Brahman, one must be free from Desire.

Knowing this, the people of old did not wish for offspring. What shall we do with offspring, they said, we who have this self and this world of Brahman? The Ātman is That which is without and above hunger and thirst, sorrow and passion, decay and death. Realizing that Ātman, Brāhmaṇas conquer the desire for progeny, for wealth and possessions, and even for heaven, and embrace the life of renunciation as homeless mendicants, subsisting by the strength which the knowledge of Ātman alone gives; then they devote themselves to contemplation till they are ultimately merged in the Brahman. (*Bṛihad. Upanishad.*)

This is the true and typical note running through Hinduism in all its developments through the ages, in its different sects and schools. While Vedism or Brahmanical religion expects renunciation in the last two stages of life as the natural fruit of discipline undergone in the first two stages, Buddhism or Jainism is a call to renunciation irrespective of stages of life, and admits recruits from all its conditions and classes, the ascetic order not being the creation or innovation of either. Each only brings an addition to the number of ascetic brotherhoods already flourishing in the country.

The new thought was spreading through appropriate educational methods and agencies, the residential schools in the homes of the teachers, bands of scholars travelling and teaching (*charakas*) through the country, scholastic dis-

putations at noted centres of learning, and conferences of philosophers invited by Kings to their courts. We see in the Brāhmaṇas and Upanishads how the country was throbbing with an intense intellectual life and spiritual fervour infecting even the Kings. Some of these Kings were not merely the patrons of learning but its best devotees and exponents. Such were King Janaka of Videha, Ajātasatru of Kāśī, Pravāhana Jaivali of Pāñchāla, and Āśvapati of far-off Kaikeya, who were themselves renowned not as Kings but as philosophers and founders of new doctrines, counting even Brahmins as their pupils though normally the Brahmins as a class were the representatives of learning under the leadership of scholars like Yājñavalkya, or the Aruṇis, Uddalaka and Śvetaketu.

Let us now turn to the secular aspects and achievements of the Aryans in conquering, colonising, and civilizing the country. The Vedic hymns that were sung on the banks of the Kubha (Kabul), Krumu (Kurram), Gomati (Gomal) or Suvāsty (Swut) were soon heard on the banks of the five rivers of the Punjab and beyond, on the banks of the Śutudru (Sutlej), Yamunā and Gaṅgā. Rigvedic civilization first won for itself the land of seven rivers (*sapta-sindhavah*) and was led by the five principal peoples (*pañcha-janāḥ*) known as Anus, Druhyus, Pūrus, Turvaśas and Bharatas. But its nucleus rather lay in the holy land, the land of the Bharatas called Brahmarshideśa between the Sarasvatī and Drishad-

vati. Much of the *Rigveda*, was composed in this region and bears its local colouring, describing its natural features of cloud and rain, thunder and lightening; just as a part of it, dwelling on the beauties of dawn (*ushas*), must have been composed in the western drier regions of the Punjab where those twilight beauties are best seen.

Later, Vedic Literature reveals a greatly extended Aryan territory up to Eastern India, with some new states and peoples like Kuru-Pañchāla, Kosala, Kāśī, and Videha, and also Magadha and Āṅga not fully Aryanised. It was this large Aryan world which was the physical background of the culture of the Brāhmaṇas and Upanishads, of which the chief centres and exponents have been already noticed.

An appropriate polity was also taking shape under the inspiration of this culture. The King was the nominal sovereign, the real sovereign was *Dharma* which was enforced by the King as its *Danda*. *Dharma* ruled the King in the person of his preceptor. Thus Vasiṣṭha and Viśvamitra, though Brahmins were the real political leaders of the country. The King was further bound at coronation by appropriate oaths of loyalty to *Dharma*, to Law and Constitution.

Vedic kingship was further limited by the popular Assemblies called *Sabha* and *Samiti*, "the twin creations of Prajāpati," implying that society and democracy were born together in India. India was thus the first country in the world

to conceive of democracy and voice its demands. The *Rigveda* and *Ātharvaveda* contain prayers for eloquence in debate to influence the Assembly. They also tell of Kings deposed and reinstated.

Vedic civilisation was also built on an economic basis, on progress in pasture, agriculture, handicrafts, and trade. The domesticated animals included kine, horses, sheep, goats, asses and dogs. The water for irrigation was drawn out of wells in buckets (*kośa*) tied to leather strings (*varatara*), pulled round a stone pulley (*aśma-chakra*) or supplied from lakes (*hrada*) and canals (*kulya*). The water was led off into broad channels (*sūrmī-sushirā*). The grains grown included rice (*vrihi*), barley (*yava*), sessamum (*tila*), beans (*māsha*), maize (*godhūma*), lentils (*masūra*) and the like.

As regards handicrafts, there were the carpenter (*takshan*), blacksmith (*karmāra*), and goldsmith (*hiranya-kāra*). The weaver (*vāya*) worked with his loom (*veman*), shuttle (*tasara*), warp (*otu*) and woof (*tantu*).

Trade comprised barter and perhaps money-economy too. Ten cows are quoted as price for an image of Indra (*Rigveda*, IV. 24, 10). There is also mention of a gift of 100 *nishkas* and 100 studs; and of $\frac{1}{8}$ th and $\frac{1}{16}$ th being paid either as interest or part of the principal. (*Ib.* I. 126, 2; VIII, 47, 17)

The dress of the times included a garment, an undergarment (*nivi*) and an overgarment (*adhivasa*). Dress woven of wool (*urnā*) was also used. The ornaments were of

gold and comprised *karnaśobhana* (ear-ring), *nishka* (necklace) and *rukma* (garland).

The *Rigveda* mentions musical instruments like the drum, *dundubhi* (I. 28, 5), lute, *karkari* (II, 43, 3), lyre or harp, *vina*, with its 7 notes, recognised and distinguished (X. 32, 4), as also the flute, *nādi* (X, 135, 7).

Later Vedic literature gives evidence of expanding economic life. The *Vājasaneyi Samhitā* (XI-XVIII) tells of the construction of a fire-altar with 10,800 bricks and shaped like a large bird with outspread wings. There are references to *nāvaja* (boatman, *Śat.*

Br. II. 3,3,5), ferryman (*śambi* in *Av.* IX, 2,6), rudders (*nau-maṇḍa* in *Śat. Br.* II. 3,3,15), oars (*aritra*) and a ship of 100 oars (*śatāritra* in *Vaj.* XXXI. 7) used for sea-voyages.

The progress in civilisation is also indicated in the extended use of metals like gold (*hiranya*), bronze (*ayas*), swarthy Iron (*śyāma*), copper (*loha*), lead (*śisa*) and tin (*trāpu*) (*Vaj.* XVIII, 13). *Ayas* undefined in the *Rigveda* is now differentiated as *śyāma-ayas* to indicate iron (*Av.* XI. 3,1. 7; IX, 5,4), *lohita-ayas* (*Ib.* XI. 3,1.7) or *lohāyas* (*Śat. Br.* V. 4,1,2) and red *ayas* or copper.

RADHA KUMUD MOOKERJI

II.—INDIAN IDEAS ON THE RELATION OF LABOUR TO CAPITAL

In all ages labour, skilled and unskilled, organised or unorganised, has been a necessary agent for the production of wealth. In ancient India, there was not much scope for capital and organised labour, agriculture being the main stay of the population, as it continues to be even to-day. But the importance of the part played by labour in national economy and the problems arising out of the relationship between employer and employed were recognised, and one finds wisdom in the old saying: "for the labourer a discerning master is rare, as for the employer is a faithful, intelligent and truthful servant."

THE EMPLOYER (BHARTĀ, SVĀMĪ)

The characteristics of a good master were mentioned as courtesy, liberality and kindness—especially when the labourer confessed a fault—the faculty to discern right from wrong and the ability to recognise the workman's worth. (*Hitopadeśa*, II. 57: III. 104) A discerning employer should not change frequently the labourers in his service, but encourage and treat with kindness such of them as were well-trained and experienced in their occupations, and not terminate their services unless it were for very grave faults. (*Hit.* II. 57, 130) The employer would alienate his servants by payment

of low wages (*hinabhrti*), by harsh words and insults and by severity of punishment. (*Sukraniti*, II. 415 f.) Only a bad master would indulge in unreasonably overworking his men, raising in them hopes not to be fulfilled, withholding their wages or keeping them in arrears. (*Hit.* II. 58; *Suk.* II. 396—*Bhrtilopa*, *Bhrtivilambana*) Labour is perishable; the worker is inseparable from his work; he spends his life for his living, at the same time wearing himself out with his work. (*Hit.* 24) It is not right therefore, that he should go without adequate recompense. (*Hit.* IV. 12) Classified in accordance with this standard, employers were grouped into three classes kind, cruel, and just. A kind master is indulgent to his labourers: he is cruel who construes even their virtues as faults: and is just who deals with them judiciously. (*Hit.* II. 59f.)

THE LABOURER (*Bhrtiya*, *Bhrtaka*)

The qualities necessary in the labourer were given as special aptitude, capacity or skill in work, faithfulness, cheerfulness, uprightness and general contentment. (*Hit.* II. 63, 73: III. 105) Labourers were also divided into three classes in accordance with their qualifications—the best (*sreshthta*), those of average ability (*sama*) and the worst (*hina*): or quick (*sighra*), ordinary (*madhya*) and dull (*manda*). The first class cared rather for fame: the second for both wealth and fame; while the last wanted only wealth. (*Sukra* II. 417) An inactive labourer was

paid less than his comrade of average activity, and the latter less than his more quick friend. (*Suk.* II. 403)

THEIR RELATION—CONTRACTS. (*Parimita*)

The relation of employer and employed was generally fixed by contract, and wages were paid as agreed upon. (*Suk.* II. 392: *Kautilya*, 185) Only a bad workman would ask for wages in the course of his work and it was only a bad master who would not pay his labourer wages due for work done. (*Hit.* II. 30) Yājñavalkya went to the extent of condemning all engagements of workmen not previously based on agreement. (II. 197) The contract was of three kinds—depending on the time taken, the work accomplished or on both. (*Suk.* II. 393ff.) If the employer refused to allow the workmen to finish their work as agreed upon they were to be paid their wages in entirety, i. e., for the unfinished portion of the work also. (*Vishnu* V. 153f.) The labourer should neither leave any portion of his work undone, nor carry away with him anything from his place of work without permission of his master. (*Kaut.* 185 *Narada* VI. 5) If he neglected the work or put it off purposely without sufficient cause, he was to be fined and detained until the work was finished and the loss incurred by the employer was to be made good by extra work. (*Kaut.* 184). Yājñavalkya was apparently more severe in cases of breach of contract. (II. 196)

WAGES (*Vetana*, *Bhrti*)

The amount paid as wages

depended on the contract, the nature, quality and quantity of the work, the main factors being the skill of the labourer and the work turned out, besides other considerations of time and place. (*Suk.* II. 400f: *Kaut.* 185 for example) In cases where the wages were not previously fixed Kautilya suggested that it should depend on the nature of the work, the time taken, the efficiency of the labourer and the general custom. (183f.) Thus the same wage-earner might not get the same amount at all times; labour in one place could not demand the same wage as in another; and one workman might not get as much as his comrade engaged in the same occupation. Wages were considered high if they, besides supplying the labourer food and clothing adequately, allowed him a comfortable living; ordinary, when he was given only the indispensable necessities for himself and his dependents; and low if the wage maintained only one. (*Suk.* II. 396f.) Low wages were condemned, as it was recognised that the labourer should get at least the minimum with which he could bring up a family and meet his "compulsory charges." (*avaśyaposhyavarga*—*Suk.* II. 399) Yājñavalkya said: a little more than the fixed wage should be paid to the worker, if he could show a larger output. (II. 198)

WORKING HOURS; LEAVE AND PENSION RULES.

Regarding the hours of work it seemed to have been accepted that during the day the labourers could

be detained by the employer for only 9 hours (3 yāmas), and the maximum period for which a workman could be kept at his work, day and night was not to exceed 12 hours, 3 hours respite during the day for the discharge of his domestic duties (*grhahkrtyārtha*) and 9 hours rest at night being the minimum to be allowed. (*Suk.* II. 404 f.) The workmen were in addition let off occasionally on days of festival (*utsava*), and the necessary performance of *śrāddha* ceremony. (*Suk.* II. 405). If they fell sick (*ārta*) they were to be allowed a week's leave at a time on full pay (*Suk.* II. 407) not to exceed a fortnight in the year. (*Suk.* II. 449) To workmen suffering long from sickness, the employer was advised to pay gratis three-fourths of the stipulated wages for the period of three months, provided they had served for five years, but for not more than six months in any case. (*Suk.* II. 406f.) If for any unforeseen cause the work could not be completed by the labourer within the allotted time, he was to be allowed a week's grace; beyond that no extension was to be given, and the work had to be finished even if it entailed the calling in of outsiders for assistance at the expense of the labourer himself. (*Kaut.* 185) Workmen of exceptional ability were to be given in addition one-eighth of their wages as bonus every year and allowed a remission of an eighth part of the usual period of work. (*Suk.* II. 412) The employer was also advised to keep with him in safe

custody a sixth or fourth of the servants' wages and to pay off half the amount or the whole of it as required, in two or three years. (II. 414) This resembles our modern Provident Fund Scheme. At retirement, after 40 years of approved service, the labourer received half his wages as pension for life (Śuk. II. 410),

which was to be extended to the members of his family in case he were incapable but well-behaved. (Śuk. II. 411) These rules appear to be much in advance of the age in which they were laid down, and show much in common with modern economic ideas on the problem of Labour and Capital.

S. V. VISWANATHA

A SOLAR STOVE

"Hitch your wagon to a star" is a phrase that may soon lose its connotation of the impractical, since the "harnessing" of sunbeams has become a popular occupation among American scientists. Experiments under way at the Smithsonian Institute and the General Electric Laboratories are transforming sunlight into electricity. An impressive task—considering the fact that every square-yard of sunlit Earth constantly receives the equivalent of a horsepower in the vibrations of the solar rays.

Dr. Charles G. Abbot has been working on the problem for years, and has now exhibited a solar furnace which can generate temperatures in excess of 400 degrees Fahrenheit (found quite sufficient to generate steam for power pur-

poses). His latest heat collector is a solar stove, now in use at Mount Wilson, California. "Last summer," reports Dr. Abbot, "we baked bread, boiled eggs, roasted meat, canned fruit, and did most of the family cooking for the greater part of the season with heat from the Sun. The oven is insulated and will hold considerable heat over night and even into a cloudy day, so that it was possible to bake bread night or day for weeks at a time." Thus far, solar rays have been harnessed and utilized successfully for a wide range of purposes—the most notable of which include cooking, heating and pumping water, drying fruits and vegetables for winter storage, running motors and generating steam to drive dynamos.

M—R. W.

FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE

INTEGRATION OF THE PRESENT CONFLICT

[In his biographical studies as in his autobiography *A Modern Prelude*, Hugh P.A. Fausset reiteratingly shows how life-failure results from disunity and disorganization among the different constituents of man; he also points out the necessity for man to integrate himself.

The process of becoming whole, or as Mr. Fausset points out unifying mind and heart, depends on a correct comprehension of the dual nature of the human mind. In Zoroastrian Esotericism we come across Akem-Mano, the Evil-Mind and Vohu-Mano, the Good-Mind; in Brahmanical Esotericism we have Kama-Manas, the Passionate Mind and Buddhi-Manas, the Compassionate Mind. Says *The Voice of the Silence*: "To live and reap experience, the mind needs breadth and depth and points to draw it towards the Diamond Soul. Seek not those points in Maya's realm; but soar beyond illusions, search the eternal and the changeless SAT, mistrusting fancy's false suggestions."—EDS.]

It is a truism that in the West to-day men are caught in such a net of facts and opinions that effective action or decisive living has become more and more difficult. There is, of course, no lack of activity of a kind. But this activity corresponds very closely to the kind of knowledge which abounds. At a glance both seem very much alive. A visitor from some more restful planet, dropping suddenly into one of our large towns or even on to one of our by-pass roads, could certainly not accuse us of physical indolence; nor after contemplating the books, that pour weekly from the printing press, our periodicals and daily papers, and the programmes of the B.B.C. could he condemn us for mental sloth. And yet if he were a man of spiritual perception, he could not but be bewildered and then depressed by the small proportion of real meaning in so much movement of body and mind. And

one does not need to be a stranger from another sphere to feel at times that modern life, whether it rush by in a flood of traffic or of fiction, of argument or of advertising, is indeed

a tale
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
Signifying nothing.

Yet Life is never such a tale. It always signifies something. And I am not of those who see in modern life merely a whirlpool in which eventually civilisation will drown. Probably there was never an age in which the din of the transitory and the trivial sounded more incessantly. But there can have been few in which the hunger for vital knowledge was more prevalent or the disposition to be impartial in the supplying or the pursuit of it. These are virtues no less for being conditioned by a basic defect. And though I wish here to emphasise the necessity of faith, I might as truly say that I

wish to emphasise the necessity of knowledge. For the most pressing need and problem of to-day is to reconcile faith and knowledge, which is something quite different from effecting a spurious compromise between them, such as Organised Religion has attempted. An uneasy compromise between knowledge and faith is ultimately more devitalising than an honest divorce. But a divorce has deadly consequences too, and the distracted face of the modern world declares them. How did this divorce come about? The state of inward division in the primitive man is an elementary expression of that which has culminated in the fevered self-conflict of the civilised man. It is so elementary an expression that many who have been stricken with the "strange disease of modern life"* have failed altogether to see the germs of their disease far back in human history and have tried to cure it by returning to its primitive source. But the difference between the primitive and

the civilised man is only one of degree. The former has just set his foot upon the path of self-consciousness; the latter has reached a point on it when he must either by a willing or a forced death of the personal self break through to the plane of pure being and the new consciousness such being brings.

In the primitive man faith and knowledge are still almost one in instinct. But the identity between them even on this level is not complete. He has separated in however small a degree from the organic Nature to which the trees and beasts wholly belong. And although primitive man is, like the child, still overruled as a creature by the creative rhythm of life so that his knowledge, however limited in range, is rooted in vital perception, he has become just conscious enough to begin to interpret and direct his instincts, and even occasionally to give them a perversely personal twist. His animal faith, therefore, is no longer perfect. The possibility of

* Esoteric philosophy offers a different explanation: the Birth of Self-consciousness is a psychological and not a physiological process, i. e., human self-consciousness did not evolve out of animal consciousness. That Birth of the Human Soul or Self-consciousness made the fundamental difference between savage races and civilized races, between whom the difference is not merely of degree as the modern man is apt to think. Again, our Esoteric Philosophy would say to our esteemed contributor that "the strange disease of modern life" is not common to the primitive savage and the modern man; it becomes so when the civilized-sick go to the healthy-savage and try to educate him just as a trainer educates the animal to act like man. That disease is due to mistakes made by our "direct ancestors" the civilized men of a very remote period whose knowledge outran their moral perceptions and produced a loss of balance i. e., a division in their make up. Many of those "direct ancestors" are living in us to-day. Esoteric Science also teaches how integration can take place in the make up of the modern man. All this may not prove palatable to modern theorists; but there are a few who may desire to know the truth wherever it may come from. To them we would point to H. P. Blavatsky's *Secret Doctrine*, especially the second volume.—EDS.

error has arisen in him with the faculty of free-will and hence this conflict between unconscious faith and conscious knowledge which has been and is being fought out almost to the death in the modern civilised man. For in civilisation we see man learning to think for and of himself. And this thinking is a kind of death. Slowly but surely it saps the power of instinctive living and that unconscious faith which expresses the elementary will to life.

There is, however, a stage in this process when the instinctive will to life in man is still powerful—but he exploits it cunningly for his own advantage. In doing so, however, he merely accelerates the process of his self-destruction. In perverting the will to life to personal ends, he becomes ever more conscious of division within and without. His self-awareness grows increasingly acute, but it is the awareness of a thinking unit divorced from a living whole and the knowledge which the unit accumulates with a fever of acquisitiveness is, like the possessions it multiplies, disorganic, and tends to become so materialised as to lose all meaning. For the more exclusively conscious a man becomes of the material aspect of life, the further removed he is from its inner reality. In the unity of true understanding the subject and the object become one; the outward form of things is transfigured and dissolved in a recognition of its inner meaning. But to the divided man every object stands out in hard, in-

hospitable relief, because he is separated from it. He can manipulate such objects, organising and exploiting them for his own ends, and he can even study impartially and with more and more refinement their physical make-up. But the gulf between him and them remains. And so their real meaning, of which their material form is only a potentially luminous envelope, eludes him, as does the real meaning of himself.

Although there are countless intermediate stages between that of primitive instinct in which self-consciousness has hardly begun and the civilised rationality in which it has become a deathly disease, beneath them all is the fissure ever widening between faith and knowledge, thought and being.

Such, very briefly and summarily, is the psychological pattern of man's evolution in consciousness, whether viewed in the macrocosm of human history or in the microcosm of certain individual lives. It is possible to conceive an evolution from pure unconsciousness to pure consciousness which would be an organic unfolding, altogether devoid of the stress and waste of conflict. But on this planet for many thousand years at least division has been a condition of growth; the power of conscious thought has emerged only by shattering the unity of instinctive being. Partial knowledge has been acquired at the inevitable cost of unconscious faith. And now we are faced with the crisis when beneath the pale cast of thought the old organic

life of the natural man has wilted and died, while the new life of the spiritual man has yet in humanity at large to be born. Behind and within the process of self-conscious thinking which Western man has exemplified with ever-increasing intensity for the last three hundred years has been the will to personal life. Behind and within the pure consciousness of a to-morrow, near or remote, must be the will to selfless being. Only so can the half-knowledge of science as it is to-day and the half-faith of contemporary religion be transcended in the living truth which will make men free. A glance at the relations of official science and religion in the West to-day may help to show how inevitable it is that the reintegration of knowledge in faith and of faith in knowledge which is vital to civilisation will spring, and indeed is already springing, from new roots whether in the individual or in the social body. For the organic cannot be grafted on to the disorganic. It must grow up from a new centre and depth in life until at last in its ripe strength it consumes the sickly tissues of the disorganic and transforms the whole body into radiant health. And so will it be with our disorganic science and religion of to-day. For although the one seems very much alive and the other conventionally moribund, both lack a creative centre. Yet the divorce from Religion which Science proclaimed in the last century was necessary to both and merely registered on the social surface of life the break in the uni-

ty of human experience, which originated in the first doubt man entertained concerning an instinctive impulse and the first question he asked of the unseen powers to which before he had implicitly submitted. And during the last fifty years, despite all the bland pronouncements of eminent ecclesiastics that religion and science were no longer in conflict, there has been and could be no real approach to reunion. Natural Science has greatly increased the knowledge it derives from external sense-perception and its mode of thought has come to permeate our modern mechanical civilisation. But while man has concentrated his attention on the world of the physical senses with really remarkable results in material, industrial and technical efficiency, his inner life has almost atrophied. For the constant stimulus from the external senses upon which the thought of natural science has depended, could not but deaden the life of the soul, which needs to be nourished by finer kinds of contemplation, by a communion with super-sensual reality, and a continual effort to express that reality within the limits of the actual. This culture and concentration of the inner life, this quickening of the soul-life in the midst of the sense-life, has always been the concern of Religion. And the churches profess, of course, sincerely enough their concern for it to-day, but ineffectively. Over the majority of men and women who consciously or unconsciously, critically or uncritically, appreciate the impartial methods of science,

they exercise no influence at all. And this is primarily, I am convinced, because dogmatic church-Christianity is not disinterested.*

The churches, in fact, are impotent because they fear to abandon the claims to special privilege in their Saviour and themselves, which the spirit of truth rejects. But if organised Christianity shrinks from that fearless abandonment of self and its vested interests without which it can possess neither faith nor knowledge in their fulness, the partial knowledge, which has been so widely acquired through the methods of science and so effectively applied to the surface of life, has certainly proved a very inadequate substitute for that unquestioning faith which in times past sustained and inwardly unified the life of man, though it lacked the complex external organisation it can boast to-day. But the mass of men and women who have grown up with little conception of truth beyond that popularised by natural science are fundamentally impotent too. The incessant movement of body and mind betrays the fact of this spiritual impotence no less than the kindly exhortations of Anglican clerics on the wireless or the aridly autocratic tones of their Roman Catholic rivals.

How then are men to throw off spiritual impotence? How are they to discover a knowledge which is not disabling and a faith which is not a blindness? They will certainly not do so by trying to return to the physically primi-

tive or by any combination of autocracy and servitude, arrogance and ignorance, such as we see prevalent in parts of Europe to-day and which proclaims an inner defeat no less than the defeatism from which it is a convulsive reaction. Not in strident reaction, but in reintegration, basic and progressive, is to be found the new life which we need.

The conflict in Western man between faith and knowledge, being and self, has culminated to-day in a state of spiritual impotence. In other words the rhythm of man's being has gone awry. When an individual is conforming truly to the will of life, all that he does is a harmonious expression of what he is. His acts, however humble, have meaning. They communicate his particular quality within the general order, which of course is quite different from advertising his personality in defiance of that order.

And if we look more closely into the nature of this action-in-being and being-in-action, we shall find that spontaneity is combined in it with an underlying constancy, that such a man acts with inspired rightness on the circumference because he rests upon a creative centre in himself, so that acting he yet does not act, while even his apparent inaction is really an act of grace. This conception of action within inaction will of course be familiar to all students of the *Gita*. But it is worth

* And the same may be said of every organized religion without a single exception.—EDS.

re-stating because it is so particularly relevant to the condition of Western man to-day in whom faith and knowledge have become divorced. His condition presents an exact contrast with that of the integrated man whom I have just described. Most of his actions, in which, of course, I include his words, express very little of his real self. There is more movement in them than meaning, and those which are distinctly his own are apt to suggest self-display rather than self-fulfilment. Similarly he expends much energy recklessly, but rather as if driven on by some demon than as one in whom the free play of life is harmoniously governed and directed from within.

Such are some of the more obvious symptoms of the dislocated rhythm of modern life. Man lacks a compass and the more wilfully he hastens this way and that, the further he is from his true course. He has forgotten that creative freedom is the experience only of those who submit perfectly to creative law and that defiance of this law results in the bondage of Samsāra, of delusive desire and the distracted mind.

The split between faith and knowledge has been necessary to human evolution. For Man must grow up and in doing so transform his faith in the crucible of self-consciousness from an instinct into an intuition. Unfortunately in doing so he has lost the integrity of a creature without acquiring that of a creator. Divided in himself he has become the slave

of partial knowledge and by this knowledge he has multiplied objects and opinions which deepen his discord and through which he dissipates his being. But since we can see how this has come about, we can at least suggest how it may be remedied. To quote from the *Maitri Upanishad*,—

The mind, in truth, is for mankind
The means of bondage and release:
For bondage, if to objects bound;
From objects free—that's called release!

The mind at present is for Western man chiefly a means of bondage. Yet only through this exclusive and tyrannical assertion of the rational faculty might the mind become, as never before except in rare individuals, the means of release. It has already refused to be bound to the unreal objects of organised religion which deaden the spirit, by deifying the word, and it will, I believe, refuse eventually to be bound to the unreal objects of a machine-age. But before this can happen Man will have to feel so strongly the necessity of becoming the organic being of which the machine is a soulless caricature that he will cast down the idol of mental egoism in himself. The modern machine in its shining efficiency is the necessary product of the mind of man working in isolation from the heart, conscious, therefore, of only the grosser forces and forms of matter, and impelled chiefly by the lust to master and exploit them. Such a product has its uses. But Man cannot know how to use it until he has ceased to be enslaved in himself by the uncentred mind which

manufactured it. Only an organism can live in freedom amidst mechanism. And the mind of Man will not become organic by any superficial adjustment, such as the mechanic can apply to a machine. An organism must grow. And it is in the evolution of a true from a partial self-hood that the mind will cease to be a means of bondage, and become the eye of the Spirit that is whole. To quote again from the *Maitri Upanishad*,—

So long the mind should be confined,
Till in the heart it meets its end.
That is both knowledge and release!
All else is but a string of words!

I have not space left to explore the depth of meaning contained in these lines, but the solution of the problem of the living relationship of faith and knowledge is to be found in them.

To-day, despite appearances to the contrary, most of us know too little to act truly, while we lack the faith requisite for growth in real knowledge. But the belief we need is not assent to certain doctrines. Real faith, as Wesley said, is not "an opinion nor any number of opinions put together, be they ever so true. It is the vision of the Soul, that power by which Spiritual things are apprehended."* But if faith is the power, a transformed and illuminated reason is the faculty, by which spiritual things are apprehended. And each is necessary to the other. In true being such faith and such reason are indistinguishably one,

even as the mind that in the heart meets its end. For the meeting place of mind and heart is the Creative Self, the Atman which is at one with Brahman. In reality the conflict is between whole being and half-being, between the integrated and the divided consciousness. We need more faith that we may have more knowledge, and more knowledge that we may have more faith, until the impulses of science and of religion, working to-day in sickly official separation, meet, not in any spurious external alliance, but in the organic harmony of that spiritual perception which comes inevitably to liberated men and women.

And even if it remains for a spiritualised race of the future thus to reconcile faith and knowledge in real being, we can at least begin to discard the unreal antitheses that interested professions have set up between them. We can, for example, dismiss from our minds the idea that real faith necessitates intellectual assent to either some formulated creed or to some hypothesis of science. Each of these represents a mental definition of experience, and as such is at best only relatively real. The creed may be a more comprehensive and profound definition than the scientific hypothesis. But it, too, is partial and the more dangerously partial for claiming to contain the whole and final truth. No definition and so no dogma can

*Esoteric Philosophy defines faith as "a quality endowed with a most potent creative power." But faith is not blind-belief, nor does it require grace from without for its awakening, but it does need the will-power from within; without will it is like a wind-mill without wind—barren of results.—EDS.

represent more than a skeleton of experience and in some degree it is always a distorted one. The more men become conscious of these arbitrary distortions, the less can they clothe the skeleton with the flesh of a living meaning. So it is to-day with the exclusive dogmas of the Christian churches. They are the twisted bones of a skeleton which life refuses any longer to clothe with meaning. And faith, conceived truly as creative inspiration, has no concern with them. We see its true nature far less in those who insist that we should believe that Jesus of Nazareth was "very God of very God" than in the faith of a grain of mustard seed or of a fledgling tipped from its nest and finding its wings. For faith in its essence transcends any intellectual assent to doctrine or even conscious statement of belief. It is surrender to the creative will within and beyond the self and as such is one with love. The love that casteth out fear is identical with the faith that casteth out doubt. They are the key by which the individual enters into the greater life and resolves the false tension of egoism.

When faith has become an implicit state of being, it can give reasons for itself, since it is the very reason of Being. But until this has happened, all intellectual argument for or against faith is of little profit since it is merely the play (serious or frivolous) of the partial self-hood and impedes the growth of organic being. The apparently insoluble problems will either be solved or perceived

to be unreal as the mind itself becomes an integrated faculty. "Christian" in *The Pilgrim's Progress*, it will be remembered, had faith enough to advance in spite of the lions which he saw barring his way. It was only when he had advanced in faith that he saw they were chained.

And such faith, which is at once courage, selflessness, and a venture of the imagination, is always the condition of true knowledge. For without it we cannot awaken the reality in ourselves by which we can divine the reality outside ourselves. To be in a state of faith is to be so profoundly in tune with life and light as to dissolve death and darkness both in oneself and in one's surroundings, and thus to unveil the truth. It is a state which in this age is particularly hard to grow into. For the upspringing of real faith in the soul involves not merely an abandonment of delusive mental and physical activities but a readiness to enter upon and persist in a fundamentally new way of life. To live in faith is to realise at ever deeper levels that harmony which transcends the divided faculties of thought and feeling. The rhythm of the world will only cease to be strained and fevered when it has recovered this central harmony, not by denying the one-sided knowledge of the present to return to the one-sided creeds of the past, but by growing towards that future when knowledge and faith are identified in the creative insight of the whole man.

HUGH I'A. FAUSSET

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

BUDDHA AND BUDDHISM*

[Dr. Kalidas Nag shows how the Great Buddha continued the age-long task of reform which always tries to purify the corruption in religious and philosophical thought. — Eds.]

Founders of religion, especially in ancient days, found little time or inclination to record, in writing, their thoughts and realisations. Of Zarathustra we have a few hymns; the entire Zend-Avesta is not accepted to be his personal composition. Lao-tze and Confucius similarly left us legacies of their sparkling thoughts shining through the ill-assorted texts of Taoism and Confucianism; but helped as we are by the admirable Chinese sense of precision, it is difficult, as ever, to disentangle the *authentic* from the *apocryphal*. Their great Indian contemporaries in the field of spiritual reformation were Vardhamāna Mahāvīra, the founder of Jainism and Gotama Buddha, the preacher of the first world-religion, Buddhism. There is little doubt that some of their fundamental doctrines and sayings are preserved substantially through the Canonical texts composed centuries after them. But we cannot forget that there is a world of difference between a direct *revelation* and its indirect *recording*, maybe by contemporaries or immediate successors. The Seers are, mostly

speaking, sayers; but their sayings are often pegs for later speculations, now amplifying then distorting the original statements. Lots of discrepancies have thus been detected among the writings of the Evangelists each professing to record *verbatim* the words and parables of Jesus. So, in the history of Buddhism, we find various attitudes: naive acceptance, scepticism and critical reconstruction, in the handling of legends and histories, canons and doctrines.

One of the foremost thinkers of the world as he is the Buddha did not condescend to be an author. He was a teacher and preacher *par excellence*. He addressed his audience in *Prākṛit*, the living speech of common men and women, and not in the scholastic *Sanskrit*. But as there were no stenographers ready at hand, his *prose* addresses must have been "constituted" texts giving as faithful a summary as possible under the circumstances. His *poetic* utterances however were more easily and faithfully retained and transmitted, especially because a good deal of the *Subhāsitavali* or Good Sayings were metrical forms

* *Iti-Vuttaha or Sayings of Buddha*. Trans. by Justin Hartley Moore (Columbia University Press, New York \$ 2.50.)
Early Buddhist Scriptures. Edited and translated by Edward J. Thomas, (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., Ltd., London. 10s. 6d.)

of our ancestral wisdom, freely distributed by the veteran mass educator, amidst his longer prose sermons.

This problem of capital importance came to be discussed by Mr. Justin H. Moore when he set himself the task of giving the English translation of the *Iti-Vuttaka*, the Logia or Sayings of Buddha, in the Indo-Iranian series of the Columbia University. By that time the Pali Text Society of London had published over forty-six Buddhist texts in fifty-nine volumes, in the course of the twenty-five years of its fruitful career under the direction of the late Professor T. W. Rhys Davids. His magnificent *Pali-English Dictionary* (completed in 1925 after his death by Dr. W. Stede) however, was not available to Mr. Moore who had to depend largely on Childer's *Pali Dictionary* (London 1875) "inadequate and faulty" as he found it. But a gifted and versatile philologist, Mr. Moore checked his translation, duly consulting the French and German versions or editions. He was alert in noticing that the Chinese translation of *Iti-Vuttaka* by Hiuen Tsang was much shorter than the canonical *Pali* version. So additions and alterations have evidently been going on, even after the seventh century A. D., when the Chinese pilgrim visited India. The prose portions, as rightly observed by Mr. Moore, were but veiled later commentaries to the metrical sayings of the Master. The prose is dry and scholastic,

the verses rich with life and which appear, word for word, sometimes in the *Dhammapada*, another book supposed to have been pronounced by the Buddha.

Against the Vajapeya, the Asvamedha or Human sacrifices of the Vedic age, Buddha nobly affirmed:

He that killeth not, and causeth not to kill
Who doth not injure and who causeth not to injure
Hath the friendship of all creatures,
There is no wrath at him for any cause.

In words like these we touch the very speech of the Master and feel the life-breath of his great religion which conquered the heart of millions, developing the first spiritual fraternity composed of many races and diverse cultural traditions.

If evil comes to frustrate good and the harmful try to injure the harmless, the cheering words of the Master should be remembered:

Who so should think to pollute
The ocean by a jar of poison,
He could not pollute it by that
For the sea is greater than the jar.

Subdued yet profound compassion is expressed in a highly poetic passage:

Even as one standing on a mountain top
May see rocks and mankind on every side,
Just so the well-known Samadhi,
Having ascended the Highest Dharma, like a palace
Casting his glance on every side, looketh down
with grief departed,
On Mankind immersed in grief, and overcome by
Birth and Old Age.

Here we catch a glimpse of the great *Avalokiteswara* who will conquer the heart of Asia from Gāndhāra to Japan, from Central Asia to Indonesia.

The idea of immortality is supposed to be in "absolute contradiction with the usual Buddhist doctrine" says Mr. Moore. But we find clear reference to the

same in the following words of Buddha:—

These three teachers of gods and men
Givers of radiance, speaking forth the Law,
Unleash the door of immortality,
They release many from the Bond.

Thus the concepts were there, only the terms were changing with Buddhism which came to purify and not to destroy the old Brahmanical culture and ethics. So we are going to revise a great many of our opinions about early Buddhism supposed to care only for individual salvation and (paradoxically enough) taking *nirvāṇa* to be a synonym for annihilation. New Buddhist texts that are being discovered every year, especially of the Northern Mahāyāna schools, have forced us to change our attitude to the Pali Canons of the Southern Hinayana, as demonstrated admirably by Prof. Sylvain Lévi of Paris. It is opportune therefore that the scholarly translation of the *Iti-Vuttaka* has been reprinted after a quarter of a century.

We are faced to-day with the problem not simply of interpreting particular doctrines of isolated schools but that of correlating Buddhist thought with the main currents of ancient Hindu religion and Brahmanical philosophy. This work has been admirably done by Dr. Edward J. Thomas of Cambridge, in his *Early Buddhist Scriptures*. He has already made a name, publishing *The Life of Buddha* and *History of Buddhist Thought*, winnowing with rare courage and patience the Buddhist Commentaries, "700 times more in bulk to that of the Bible." In his *Early*

Buddhist Scriptures he shows a fine catholicity of outlook and a rare sense of documentation. His brilliant compilation of Buddhist texts on "Other Schools" brings home to us, the truth that to follow adequately the Buddhist scriptures we must remember the background of Pre-Buddhist thought for over a millennium from the Vedas to the sermons of Buddha. The Brahmanical disciplines of *Tri-vidyā* appear as *tevijjā*; gods like Indra, Soma, Varuna, Yama, Brahmā, Prajāpati, Iśāna; sages like Vasistha, Visvāmitra, Vāmadeva, Angirasa, Bhāradvāja, Kāśyapa, Bhrigu; and schools like those of Bahvrkas (*Rigveda*), Adhvarju, Taittiriya, Chāndogya, Yoga etc. were well known to Buddha. His discourse on the Brahmajāla Sūtra further strengthens the conviction that Buddhism should not be treated as if opening with a *tabula rasa*; rather it should be examined and interpreted with constant reference to non-Buddhist schools and their texts or doctrines. Of the divisions classifying the bulk of the Buddhist texts, the metaphysical division *Abhidhamma* is rightly considered to be a later growth as Buddha was far too practical to care for abstract discussions. But the *Sūtra* and the *Vinaya* Pitakas faithfully preserve the ancient Brahmanical tradition where we find the scholastic groups of Dharma, Artha and Kāma developing their sūtra texts. So we find that the *Arthashastra* opens with the *Vinaya* section which concerns royal disci-

pline just as the Buddhist Vinaya devotes itself to monastic discipline. So the Brahmanical concept of Ātman (soul) is opposed by anātman (non-soul), ānanda (joy) by dukkha (sorrow), immortality by cessation, maintaining however the old theories of Karma and Re-incarnation. The Brahmanical schools developed *tri-varga* into *chaturvarga* adding Moksha or liberation which may be equated with Nirvāna or release for it is not a negative but a positive notion. Very appropriately therefore has Dr. Thomas quoted as the motto of his book the profound saying of Buddha (*Vinaya* II. 239) :—

Just as the great ocean, O monks, has one taste, the taste of salt, even so O monks, this Doctrine and Discipline has one taste, the taste of release.

Dr. Thomas has proved conclusively that Buddha did not contradict everything coming from his predecessors.* His fourfold classification of Karma is the same as we find in Vyasa's commentary on the *Yoga-sutras* (IV. 7). So in his going out in search of release, he is following the path of the great Yajñavalkya of the Upanishads. He quotes approvingly the conclusions of his elder contemporary Nataputra Mahāvīra who made the basic aim of Jainism to be "the destruction of pain through the destruction of Karma."

Buddhist books were properties as well as product of the monastic order developing later on; and naturally the "Disciples' Career"

occupies the largest place in the book as also in the canons. But the Master himself was in close touch with the majority of the lay devotees, men and women. Hence his paternal "Counsels to the Laymen" are full of wisdom and enlightened tolerance. He appears as a firm believer in family purity especially safeguarding the honour of womanhood. That may explain why he hesitated to permit women to leave their families and join the Order as nuns, which fact has, however, been explained with the characteristic male bias of later monastic compilers. Buddha undoubtedly inspired some of the noblest types of Indian womanhood :—Mahāprajāpatī, Ambapālī, Soma and other nuns. Soma crushed the arguments of Māra the wicked who was trying to discourage her :—

The woman's state, what matters it?
To one whose mind is well composed
In whom knowledge is arising.

Noble self-assertion of Indian womanhood justifying her right to emancipation on equal footing with men as we find in Soma's spiritual sister Maitreyī of the Upanishadic age: that is how the Master could reclaim the talented courtesan like Ambapālī just as he did in the case of King Ajātasatru the parricide.

The biographical fragments of the Master have been collected and studied by Dr. Thomas with rare sympathy and insight. His outline drawing of the Buddha's portrait is superb. The Buddha is

not a mere legend or metaphysical reconstruction but a real historical character whom we can see and touch. His great advantage over other religious pioneers lies in this that he takes his stand firmly on his *human* qualities without the least super-human pretensions. And yet by sheer human will and discipline of human life, he soared

to great heights. He devoted the very last days and hours of his life to the edification and pacification of millions of tortured fellow beings degraded by Ignorance. He is undoubtedly the greatest personality in Indian history and one of the few towering figures in the history of the world.

KALIDAS NAG

CHRISTIANITY AND HINDUISM*

[T. R. Venkatarama Sastri, C. I. E., is a keen student of religious thought. He has made his mark as a brilliant lawyer and is highly respected for his sober political views.—EDS.]

The author of this book belongs to one continent, the reviewer to another. The distance between the two is the distance between India and America, between Hinduism and Christianity. The writer is a Christian. The reviewer is a Hindu. The Hindu has no desire to disturb the convinced Christian out of his Christianity, though the Christian author would be pleased were the Hindu reviewer to change his creed as a result of his book.

Very few of us bring free minds to the inquiry of the deeper problems of religion. We are committed to ideas from birth, for the country and the race to which we belong have each a long history and a definite line of evolution. We have our families and the surroundings in which we are born and bred, as well as our individual mental, moral and spiritual tendencies. The author is not a sceptic; he accepts approaches to religion which no sceptic would accept. He accepts revelation. He accepts faith as sufficient in itself and as justified by the universality of religious ideas. Mr. More has a predetermined conclusion and one sees from the first that the

opposite view is intended to be overthrown.

To name but one point in illustration: the sceptic of the author's imagination is startled to discover that religions are based on a single principle and are agreed in imagining certain powers behind phenomena, swayed by prayers, sacrifices and symbolic rites. The reviewer does not know of any sceptics startled by it. They maintain that religions are all superstructures built on foundations of superstition.

The Hindu Religious Philosophy considers Revelation to be the only sound basis for Religion; reasoning is an aid to the perception of what is Revealed. The author's aim may be to establish a similar premise for Christianity. Even a person with no predisposition to theistic belief and disposed to be critical, will find, so Mr. More infers, more difficulties in the way of disbelief than of belief.

The author divides his subject into eight chapters. The first is headed "Rationalism and Faith" and deals directly with the question, appealing to the sceptic to play fair and rec-

* The reader's attention may be drawn to "The Line of Buddhas" by Professor N. K. Bhagvat, published in THE ARYAN PATH for May 1932.—EDS.

* *The Sceptical Approach to Religion*.—By P. E. MORE (Princeton University Press, Princeton.)

ognize the weakness of his own case in the realm of reason. The fifth Chapter is entitled "The Illusions of Reason" and is intended to show how fallible reason itself may be and how other guides than this may well be accepted in spheres beyond the direct reach of reason. The intermediate three chapters are devoted to the exposition of Greek thought as represented by Socrates and Plato, and the emergence of Teleology in the evolution of Plato's mind as indicated in his last books. These chapters are not quite relevant to the author's task if viewed simply as the presentation of a sceptic's view; or is it the author's intention to show how one who does not approach the problem from the standpoint of religion comes near to the Christian view of Teleology?

The last three chapters elucidate the evolution of Hebrew religious thought and its natural culmination in Christianity (though it was rejected by the bulk of the Jewish people) with its message of hope to the world. This presentation is natural for a European Christian writer. Europe traces the ancestry of its culture and religion to Greece and Judæa. To Europe, Greece was the beginning of things worthwhile. In recent times there has been a growing recognition that Greek ideas themselves have a past which might touch the history of thought in other countries, but the view is still largely held, that there is nothing valuable that has come from the days before Greece. As for Hebrew thought, the Old Testament and the New form the very texture of Christianity and its message of hope.

Being interested in parallel phenomena in a country which has explored every avenue, every nook and every corner of religious thought, the reviewer would like to draw attention to certain aspects presented.

The author denies verbal inspiration to the Bible, and postulates the evolution of religious ideas in the Old Testament. Indian orthodoxy will con-

cede neither of these points in the case of their own scriptures. It may be of interest to professors of other religions to know that it is the conviction of orthodoxy in India that if once the verbal inspiration of the scriptures were yielded as unsustainable, there would be an end to the case for Revelation. This seems logical and correct. For if the Bible presented as the words of Jehovah were considered the work of a human author of fallible memory and maybe faulty recollection, argument on that basis becomes futile.

May it be that the argument for Revelation through the Bible is on ultimate analysis only an argument on the spiritual experience of the race as embodied in the Bible, and that its validity rests on the converging testimony of the people as a whole? Where all scriptures agree, there we have that converging testimony. The author does use converging testimony as argument. It used to be the view that all other religions were superstition and "mine" the one true religion. We have now reached the recognition that in all religions there is a core of truth.

Hinduism does not accept in theory the progressive evolution of religious ideas. It favours the static view; but by elaborate and subtly devised rules of exegesis silences inconvenient texts without seeming to attack their inspired character. It has also another doctrine that the scripture is valid and final only in supersensual matters. In the domain of reason it is to be set aside if contrary to reason. On the other hand, Christianity has every reason to accept progressive evolution in the Old Testament, for it is the outcome of Judaism and the claim of Christianity is based on that evolution culminating in the Incarnation.

Mr. More stresses the doctrine of free-will in man, his power to choose and his responsibility ensuing upon that choice. The purposiveness in man, he claims, suggests intelligence and purposiveness throughout the

Universe. Many have claimed to see a new factor in evolution with the advent of man. Man is not moved by mere natural impulse as animals are; he looks at and within himself, philosophises, draws conclusions as to himself and his place in the Universe, and uses language for embodying and integrating thought. "The Forest Book" of *Black Yajur Veda* says:—

Whoso realises the Tree of Life
As having its roots *Above*
And its spreading branches here *Below*
Not for an instant can that person believe
That Death can lay hands on him.

In stating the very claim of Man to immortality, the *Āranyaka* posits the human faculty as coming from, and being kin to the Divine and on that very fact maintains his immunity from death and destruction.

All this may appeal to some minds—minds already disposed to faith. But can the recognition of Free Will be usefully pressed into service? The controversy between Free Will and Necessity is uncertain in its appeal. "All theory is against it and all experience for it" is a statement that engenders not certainty but doubt. Even convinced believers in Free Will are obliged to say:

Our wills are ours we know not how
Our wills are ours to make them thine.

God's over-riding purpose and man's independent will seem to go ill together. If facts of observation take you one way and a sense of direct experience another, certain knowledge will not follow, but only doubt and perplexity. Many eminent thinkers have accepted Necessity and dismissed freedom of will as a delusion of the human mind. There are others, though few, who have resolved the seeming conflict to their own satisfaction and claimed that Necessity is true but it is not necessarily destructive of moral responsibility. If the test of a doctrine is in the character of the lives lived under its sway, it will be difficult to condemn Necessity as the parent of evil. There are good and even holy men among

Necessitarians as the author himself recognises. Those who feel that they would have no inducement to ethical conduct if they believed in the doctrine of Necessity can only speak for themselves.

The author condemns all forms of monistic or pantheistic religion or philosophy. He declaims against the bastard philosophies of Spinoza and Kant. But living in a country where religious thought has strongly flowed along monistic and pantheistic lines and watched its effects on the lives of religious men, the reviewer is unable to say that belief in a personal god as an article of faith is essential to good life. He is aware that to many it may be and only the other day he was told by an honoured and intellectual friend that for him it was essential. For influencing life and conduct something that makes for righteousness is as efficacious as a personal god.

In these high twilight regions where thought and feeling are interfused and ideas and images do not correspond to anything in the familiar world, there is little assurance of any definite conclusion, it would seem that to wrangle over these abstractions were to show a lack of recognition that there are many approaches to Ultimate Truth which no one of us, limited as we are by finite minds, can know in all its fullness.

In the author's opinion, superstition slowly ascends to the dignity of religion and theistic faith. At some point of development it fails everywhere. Even the Hebrews whose evolution of theism he concedes to be perfect and straight, were about to fail. Then came the Incarnation. Christianity with its dualism of God and Nature, he maintains, is the one and only true way of interpreting and grasping the Universe. And God can only be a personal god.

May one ask what is a personal god? Has he a form? Has he a place of residence as in all popular religions? We are told that he is Immanent, he

is everywhere and in the human heart. What does all this mean—to the believer—to the sceptic? The word *personal* in a "personal god" must have a meaning all its own, unlike anything that one understands by it in our concrete world. On the other hand we have *Brahman* in the Hindu philosophy. IT has no qualities. IT can only be described by negation of all that can be known or thought of. So IT is indescribable. Human mind and words are unable to grasp IT. Yet IT is Sat, Chit, Ananda (Existence, Intelligence and Bliss). The impersonal does not seem to be so impersonal, so unknown or so unknowable as it is represented. Yet the personal god and the impersonal Brahman seem alike beyond the power of

man fully to seize by his mere intellect.

There is a stage in the discussion of these abstruse questions where it would be wisdom to understand another's point of view and leave it there without proceeding to deliver judgment as to its worth in comparison with our own. The differences in the mode of realising the Ultimate Truth arise from the complexity and the varying types of the human mind. Those who are truly concerned with life and conduct will find no need to wrangle over these differences. Unfortunately, most books dealing with religion are not so interested in life and conduct as in the establishment of the superiority of one religion over all others.

T. R. VENKATARAMA SASTRI

Shallows and Deepes. By ARCHIBALD WEIR, M. A. (Basil Blackwell, Oxford 8s. 6d.)

Responding with proper precautions, to the call that readers should not expect to be entertained with second-hand ideas, and approaching Mr. Weir's volume with adequate preparedness to wrestle with his "stiff" style as I have had opportunity to do with Sanskrit classics of stiffer style, I find that the main thesis of this work is spiritual progress of mankind from monadic existence to realization of Universal Self through suffering from a feverish passion for the prizes, and temptations of worldly life. This has also been the goal proclaimed by religious teachers and system builders all the world over since the dawn of rational reflection. His comments on "Pelf," "Usury," "Entities," etc., found in Book 1, entitled "Understate-ments," are pungent and emphasize the *evanescence* of life and of its precious possessions. In the course of the second Book, "Deepes Beneath Consciousness," Archibald Weir has eluci-

dated the significance to mankind of three fundamental and basic truths. (1) Intimations of Immortality and Universal Self emanate like effulgent fulgurations as Leibnitz put it, from the Realm of the Unconscious. (p. 140) (2) Self is a trust and its "fiduciary" character supplies the needed spiritual guarantee of "service to manhood." (3) Realization of and homage to Universal Self is the goal of life. In Archibald Weir's picturesque phraseology, progress consists in advancement from animal to human, from human to "authentic manhood" or human-authentic.

Students of Indian Darsanas will find many a second-hand idea (in the sense of perfectly familiar stock-in-trade of philosophers) in this volume, but, it should be pointed out that philosophical discussions *must* deal with familiar and second-hand notions. Philosophy is not the design of a locomotive where novelty is witnessed and experienced with the strides of time. It must deal with basic concepts familiar and second-hand. "Brahma-

jignyasa" or "Vedanta-vichara" is "Siddha-vastu-vishaya," i.e., philosophic quest deals with settled, familiar concepts. Perhaps Mr. Weir has clothed old, familiar concepts in new phraseology which lapses frequently into the familiar style which he hates. For instance, when he writes: "Self is always part of *our being*, and agent of our *higher consciousness*. In the process of *consciousness* being reinforced from *unconsciousness*, there is a *pivot* where consciousness receives... and the pivot is the *self*" (pp. 119-20). "The deepest zone beneath consciousness, therefore, is the source of authentic manhood." (p. 140. *Italics mine*) Or again, when he asserts that "Self Universal is a sort of unity" (that a la Hegelian synthesis grips together continuity and discontinuity, i.e. thesis and anti-thesis) and that it "includes soul" which is "an activity, not an entity," (pp. 148-49) there is no doubt he sinks by the weight of conventional terminology." When the mind of his reader or reviewer is required to jump from "Self Universal" to "Soul," from "Soul" to "function of consciousness the All," it is as often entertaining as instructive.

That speculation must sooner or later be translated into experience if philosophy is worth its salt is undoubtedly the most important lesson taught

by Mr. Weir in his concluding chapter. As the Vedantins put it, speculation rational (Brahma-jignyasa) must fulfil itself into Realisation-emotional-cum-volitional. (Brahma-sakshatkara) Realisation of the Universal Life or Self is the harmonious blend of the tripartite of cognition, emotion, and conation.

But what is the practical programme outlined by Mr. Weir to enable humans to reach authentic manhood? Just social-service, Red-cross work, League-secretariat, intellectual co-operation *et hoc*? Does he believe in any programme of psycho-physical purification and control of mind like the one compulsorily enjoined by Yoga on all aspirants? If not, how is one to share in Self Universal? Does he after all give up the game as he practically seems to by maintaining that "a share in Self Universal is a *secret that cannot be taught and cannot be criticized*?" (p. 211—*The Italics mine*) What is the philosophic value of such a *secret*? *Cui Bono*? But neither this persistent query nor the comments made above will affect the general excellence and fascinatingly stimulating manner which Mr. Archibald Weir has played in his part as metaphysical mariner indicating to us the deepes and shallows of the Ocean of Philosophy.

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA

Sri Aurobindo and the Future of Mankind. By A. C. DAS, with a Foreword by Sir S. Radhakrishnan (University of Calcutta, Calcutta.)

This little book of 130 pages is a competent study of the leading ideas of the well-known Indian philosopher and yogi, Sri Aurobindo. It is peculiarly welcome since the writings of this remarkable thinker, which have appeared for the most part in the pages of a monthly magazine, *The Arya*, have never been easily accessible to the Western reader.

The fact is the more regrettable as his work is of obvious importance at this present epoch when the need for intellectual co-operation between Asia and Europe is being so acutely felt. For in Aurobindo we meet with a speculative mind in which the balance between the oriental and the occidental components in the philosophical equation is maintained with exceptional justice and subtlety. He will neither be seduced by the materialism of the West nor by the extreme idealism of the East:—

The safety of Europe has to be sought in the recognition of the spiritual aim of human existence; otherwise she will be crushed by the weight of her own unilluminated knowledge and soulless organization. The safety of Asia lies in the recognition of the material mould and mental condition in which that aim has to be worked out; otherwise she will sink deeper into the slough of despond, of a mental and physical incompetence to deal with the facts of life, and the shocks of a rapidly changing movement.

It is evident from the whole tone of the book that his philosophical affinities are more with the school of Ramanuja than with that of Sankara. The world of manifestation is not an unqualified illusion; but a realm which has to be transformed by the divine life which is everlastingly active within it. This is not to say that he has an absolutely equal appreciation of the two factors which have thus to be equilibrated. Inevitably and rightly there is an Eastern emphasis. As with almost all Oriental thinkers his centre of gravity, so to speak, is in the Unmanifested. It is from within the sphere of the Undifferentiated that he seeks to reconcile content and form. There is about his mind a characteristically airy quality. Scrupulous as he is in giving matter its due, we cannot but feel that he does not *know* its dark mystical significance in the same way as does such a typically Western figure as, say, Jacob Boehme.

The full meaning of the fact of incarnation in all its sombre weight and depth still lies beyond his power of penetration. He is racially incapable of that complete submission to matter which is at the same time the strength and weakness of the West.

Yet with all this his grasp of the problem remains masterly. This finds expression in his convincing analysis of the shortcomings of such philosophers of change as Bergson and Alexander, in his treatment of the relation between reason and intuition, and in particular in his conception of the limitations of the classical systems of *yoga*. His own "integral yoga" strikes one as being as philosophically as it is psychologically sound.

Finally Aurobindo is not only a clear, but also an individual and a forceful thinker. His exceptional sensitiveness to the limited and finite has made for a power of pregnant utterance which is a welcome relief after the suave and featureless monotony which so often mitigates the charm of the Oriental's mental processes. The Westerner feels at home with him at once.

It is to be hoped that his work will soon be made more widely known in Europe, as it certainly deserves to be.

LAWRENCE HYDE

Clashing Tides of Colour. By LOTHROP STODDARD (Charles Scribner's Sons, London. 10s. 6d.)

The author aims at setting forth briefly and pointedly the racial and cultural conflicts which underlie the present disorder in world affairs. Consequently he has refrained from considering the economic forces which have brought about conflicts between nations, a treatment of which, however important, would have carried him too far afield.

Many readers will remember Mr. Stoddard's earlier work entitled *The Rising Tide of Colour against White Supremacy*. The book, written soon after the War, was filled with the fear that the fast awakening Orient would overwhelm and finally destroy "white" civilisation which was disrupting and falling into chaos. Since then, events have happened proving disorder and disunion to be not merely peculiar to Europe but also to characterise Asia and Africa. The author accordingly while still obsessed with the fear that

"white" supremacy may be lost finds solace in this book in reviewing the disintegration and confusion which characterise the "coloured" races as well.

The book falls naturally into three parts—the first dealing with the conflicts and antagonisms now existing amongst the "whites," the second amongst the peoples of Asia, and the third amongst the peoples of Africa. In this way it covers practically the whole world in its survey, dealing as it does with Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, North and South America, Japan, China, India, Persia, Afghanistan, Turkey, Arabia and Africa. This constitutes both the merit and demerit of the book, for while it gives within the pages of one volume a bird's eye view of the problems arising from racial and cultural conflicts throughout the world, its treatment is apt to appear meagre to those well-versed in these matters. Not more than a handful of specialists may be expected to know the essentials which underlie conflicts in every part of the world. Mr. Stoddard's book will therefore be welcomed by all those who, not having sufficient time or inclination to make an intensive study of conditions existing in various countries, desire nevertheless to gain a general idea of the problems confronting the nations of the world. One wishes however that Mr. Stoddard had a greater capacity to understand cultures other than the one to which he belongs. He betrays throughout a narrowness and intolerance which prevent him from presenting dispassionately and truly the problems facing one nation as against another, especially when one of the conflicting

nations happens to belong to the "white" race. The way out of the chaos and conflict in which the world is fast sinking is certainly not through any one race, however important in its own eyes, seeking exclusive domination over all others, as the aggressive and youthful West intoxicated by its growing powers during the last two or three centuries seems foolishly to think, but by the policy of mutual sympathy and toleration which the more mature civilisations of the Orient such as India and China have always followed. This is a lesson which the West, now absorbed in making machines and money and in the process ruthlessly trampling down other races, may be expected to learn after a gradual refining and civilising of its spirit. Judging from Mr. Stoddard's book, the West has a long way yet to go before this lesson is learnt; for he advocates that the "white" races of the world should join hands together to form a "white" comity to gain supremacy if possible over the rest of the world.

The author has a vivid, graphic style which makes the book read like a novel. He writes clearly and in every case presents events in historical perspective so that the book does not require of the reader any special previous knowledge, and will be easily intelligible to all. Provided sufficient allowance is made for the author's bias towards "white" civilisation and the resultant distortion of facts connected with his analysis of conditions in the Orient, the book will be found to be of value, especially as it deals in a masterly way with problems with which every intelligent citizen of to-day will desire to be acquainted.

BHARATAN KUMARAPPA

Valmiki Ramayana. Condensed Text with Translation by P. P. S. SASTRI (G. A. Natesan & Co. Madras, Re. 1, 4 As.)

It was sad for Voltaire that the *Ezor Vedam*—about which in his *Essai sur les Moeurs et l'Esprit des Nations*, he had exerted such gleeful anti-clerical praise—should reveal itself, afterwards, to be the fabrication of a Jesuit missionary. But the whole process, since that time, of the gradual introduction of Sanskrit literature into Europe, does not seem to have been very much happier. The Greeks knew something of Indian culture; the Arabs brought Indian medical science to Spain; Bhartṛihari was done into Dutch, round about 1650; an English translation of the *Bhagavad-Gita* dates back to 1785; and there has been no break, since then in the line of distinguished Orientalists. The fact remains, none the less, that Indian literature has still not worked its way into the nervure of our own tradition: we are still mere Tourists in the East. And this unwholesome state of things seems due, more than anything else, to the fact that no translator of genius has yet appeared, to give us any one of the great monuments of the Indian spirit in its original strength and freshness.

The *Mahabharata* and the *Ramayana* are two such monuments, and neither of them has yet had anything like adequate treatment in any of the European languages. The *Mahabharata*, as I indicated in the March issue of these pages, is seven or eight times as long as the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* put together: a vast conglomerate work, in which episodes of great beauty and moral teachings of great fervour are woven into the texture of a legendary epic cycle, the work of a people rather than of particular poets. The *Ramayana*, on the other hand, is more or less the work of a single poet, Valmiki; it is rather less than a quarter the length of the *Mahabharata*, containing fewer episodes and far less

moralistic digression; and, though apparently earlier in date it is much more homogeneous and much more sophisticated in style. It belongs to the category of *Kavya*, or artificial epic, in contrast to the *Itihasa*, the legendary epic: a distinction reminiscent of the Western distinction between *Logos* and *Logopeia*.

The main story—of which Prof. Sastri's condensation preserves most of the essentials—tells of the incarnation of Vishnu in the four sons of King Dasaratha; the heroic youth of Rama, the eldest of these, and his marriage with the lovely and virtuous Sita; the evil scheming of Kaikeyi, by which Rama is banished for fourteen years, in favour of his brother, Bharata; the nobility of Bharata, who sets Rama's sandals upon the throne and rules justly as their minister; Rama's destruction of the forest giants; the capture of Sita by Ravana, their leader; the pursuit, in league with Hanuman, lord of the monkeys, who makes a bridge across the sea, over which Rama leads his army; the test of Sita by fire and the inauguration, under Rama, of the millennium. Intermixed with this are some excellent episodes: the descent of the Ganges from Heaven to purify the remains of Sagara's 60,000 sons; the contest in asceticism of Vasishtha and Vishvamitra; the first utterance by Valmiki of the *sloka* metre, drawn from him in lamentation for a loving pair of birds. And there is much incidental showing of the patriarchal morality of the post-Vedic age: Rama assures his grieving mother that "even if a woman has never bowed to the gods . . . she attains the highest heaven in serving her husband."

The *Ramayana*, in fact, is a work of immense historical interest, as well as of great beauty and power; and any attempt at an English translation must be welcomed. Unfortunately, however, the praise which must be given to Prof. Sastri's intention cannot be extended to his achievement. That

his translation is a work of considerable scholarship and votively literal cannot be doubted; but it betrays no feeling whatever for the English language, and its confusions of grand and colloquial manners sometimes produce quite ludicrous effects, as when, "Contemplating that sound, beside herself with anger, and kicking up a terrible

dust, Tataka marched against Rama and Lakshmana, making a terrific yell," or as when Sita asks, "O Rama, why do you make a sure statement of which the levity is obvious?"—The kind of blemishes which are found disastrously often in works of Anglo-Indian scholarship.

RAYNER HEPPENSTALL

Buddhist Readings—(Part One.) Compiled by BEATRICE LANE SUZUKI, M.A., (Hirano Shoten, Kyoto, Japan.)

"May those who open this little book take as much pleasure in reading it as the compiler has had in making these brief selections of Buddhist readings." Thus ends the Preface by the author who is a Western lady, wife of the Japanese scholar Dr. Suzuki, an outstanding authority on Mahayana Buddhism.

The book is written primarily for young people and will fill a great need. Educational institutions all over the world are full of the contradictory tendencies of scientific materialism and orthodox sacerdotalism. An unsectarian spiritual philosophy is the need of the hour and Buddhism being the least corrupted of all religions offers a good field for gathering material; these pieces will prove useful and helpful to all human beings irrespective of caste or creed. "Be ye lamps unto yourselves,"—"Hatred ceaseth not by hatred but by love,"—such an appeal made both to the mind and the heart of the young, will develop early in life the dual virtue of self-reliance and interdependence, and thus awaken in them that enlightened compassion which was so grandly embodied in Lord Buddha. This small book is simply written and though meant for students its "selections may be profit-

ably read by many others." Those who wish to live in the world and yet not be of the world will find here a whole list of ethical and moral instructions to be practised in daily life—while the ascetic can read with profit the strict discipline enforced in the Zen Monastery. The life stories of Buddhist saints viewed in the light of reincarnation give us a beautiful picture of heart devotion brought over from previous births. The synthesizing nature of true philosophy is equally brought out for the "teachings of Buddhism are at the basis of art, literature, social life and moral ideals," and the "great Buddhists were not only men of religion but of art and of practical life."

Among the selected pieces there are some which deal with the doctrines of the Mahayana school. Those who are not familiar with this school of Buddhism will find them an excellent introduction.

The book brings a hopeful message: it shows how Westernised Japan is slowly awakening from its spiritual sleep through the revival of Buddhism, signs of which are evident. The people there as elsewhere want short cuts to happiness and enlightenment and to save them from false teachers and pseudo-teachings the philosophy of Gautama in its pristine purity needs to be promulgated. This little book serves that purpose.

F. K. K.

Untouchable. By MULK RAJ ANAND, with a Preface by E. M. Forster (Wishart Books, Ltd., London, 7s. 6d.)

Mr. Anand's novel is of peculiar interest: it is the first novel to come out of India dealing directly and honestly with social conditions. In *Untouchable* the lowest, most unfortunate and hitherto inarticulate strata of Hindu society has found a voice. And to say this is not to belittle the great work that is being carried forward by Mr. Gandhi. To stand up for the religious recognition of the sweeper-caste in a country whose orthodoxy condemns sixty million people to the status of pariahs is the work of a spiritual leader; but to seek to interpret the mind of an individual sweeper as he goes about his loathsome business throughout the whole of an Indian day is something that could have been done only by a poet.

Again and again as one reads *Untouchable* one is astonished at the delicacy and charm with which the author has handled his extremely difficult material. It would have been easy to shock the complacent with a bald account of the business of a latrine-cleaner and, although this would have been in line with the prevailing taste for "realism," it is doubtful whether it would have had very much effect beyond laying the author open to the charge of prurience. Only a skilful writer could have made Bakha, the sweeper-boy, into a real and loveable person and aroused pity and indignation rather than loathing for all the horrible circumstances of his life. And this is all the more remarkable in the case of Mr. Anand who, as a member of the Kshatriya caste, would in the ordinary course of events have scrupulously preserved himself from the least intimacy, let alone sympathy, for such a creature. As a child, much to the horror of his parents, Anand played with the sweeper-children. Now, much to their horror again, he has made the hero of his novel a sweeper-boy. But surely this is an example of that pervasive human sympathy trans-

cending caste-pride and prejudice such as is inculcated by the noblest wisdom of India. To profess religious beliefs and exalted motives on the one hand and yet to give them the lie in one's daily practice by denying a large section of the community the right even to the common decencies of social intercourse and citizenship on the other, is a contradiction that must one day not only bring about the downfall of a society so constituted, but must discredit religion itself. To exalt one's own "purity" at the expense of one's fellow-men, and particularly men who do useful and necessary work for the community, is not, to say the least of it, an attitude that one would expect from the inheritors of the spiritual wisdom of thousands of years.

The taboo of which the outcastes of India are the victims had its origin, it is to be supposed, in hygiene. But to-day when science and technical knowledge has placed at our disposal efficient means for doing away with much of the more unpleasant work of the world, there would seem to be no valid reason why this antiquated taboo should continue to dominate the minds of millions. As Mr. Anand suggests at the end of his book, in regard to the sweepers the whole matter could be cleared up by the introduction of so simple and obvious a thing as a proper drainage and flush system. In medieval times untouchability might have had some shadow of justification; in the world of to-day it is unthinkable. And the fact that it is a religious as well as an hygienic problem is all the more reason why the whole thing should be tackled in a humane and decent spirit of comradeship although unfortunately that is the very reason why it is not treated in this way.

I am well aware that there is no excuse for an Englishman to adopt a virtuous attitude in this matter when Britain has done nothing to relieve the condition of the Indian masses, and that it may be considered presumption on his part to take exception to the

religious practices of a people so different from his own countrymen. But there is a sphere in which these matters can be discussed that cuts right through national and racial differences—the common humanity and brotherhood which we all share and which as the world progresses towards a more humane and just social order will come more and more uppermost in men's minds. It is to this sphere that Mr. Anand's novel belongs and it is this which makes it a portent.

I cannot conclude without drawing attention to the beautiful and moving

simplicity with which the tale of Bakha is related, and the skill with which the operations of an extremely sensitive, yet child-like, nature such as Bakha's is rendered. Not only does Mr. Anand's book manage to convey the human charm and essential holiness of one of the world's humblest creatures without the least trace of self-consciousness or condescension but by the skill of its almost imperceptible recreation of the social life, scenes and prevailing atmosphere of India it attains an universal significance.

PHILIP HENDERSON

Practical Ethics. By the Rt. Hon. Sir HERBERT SAMUEL (Thornton Butterworth Ltd., London. The Home University Library Series. 2s. 6d.)

Social Judgment. By Professor GRAHAM WALLAS. Edited by MAY WALLAS (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London. 5s.)

Losing Religion to Find It. By ERICA LINDSAY (J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., London. 6s.)

Return to Philosophy. By C. E. M. JOAD (Faber and Faber Ltd., London. 7s. 6d.)

For long it was assumed that man's essential nature was represented by the intellect only. However, he has faculties other than reason. So any philosophy that gives undue prominence to intellect is bound to be unsatisfactory. Intellect may be coextensive with other constituents, but this does not mean that they are merely its forms. Hence the distrust of those systems based upon consideration of man's intellect alone.

This distrust is showing itself in many ways, one of which is found in the advice to be more practical than theoretical. The work of the Rt. Hon. Sir Herbert Samuel, *Practical Ethics*, belongs to this class. The author shuns any attempt to define the Good, because he says it is a "fictional abstraction" and both moral philosophers and

theologians have failed in its definition (p. 20). There are only "different things generally agreed to be good" (p. 21). The test of right and wrong is not in the conception of a theoretical "Good," not even in the motive, but the "total consequences of the act—direct and indirect, immediate and remote, to the agent and to the others" (p. 23). In this criterion, then, both egoism and altruism are represented. And "Society" does not exist on its own right. "The idea that 'Society' or 'State' is a reality, and is entitled to unlimited devotion for its own sake, is merely the product of the imagination of the metaphysicians running loose in a vacuum, and has no true relation to the actual life of men living in communities" (p. 54). The moral code comes only "out of mutual interaction of self-interest and social interest" (p. 55). In deciding between determinism and free will the author gives preference to the former. Of course, "what a man does depends upon what he wills." But "what he wills depends upon what he is." And "what he is depends upon these prior causes, infinite in number" (p. 66).

The author rejects intuition, conscience, instinct, the theory of "Natural Rights," the principle of evolution, and the custom of the community, as furnishing us with a moral criterion. The chapters on "The Nation and the

World" and "Conscious Evolution" are of special value. In the former it is said that every nation has duties to other nations, and Hegel's view that the "State is the absolute power on earth" and "is its own end and object" is refuted. In the chapter on "Conscious Evolution" it is pointed out that up to the stage of man, evolution is unconscious, and the species concerned do not contribute to it deliberately, but in the human kingdom the contribution is conscious and deliberate.

Sir Hebert Samuel shuns walking speculative distances. But if we begin to think and treat ethics as a science, we cannot stop arbitrarily at a point saying that it is enough for our practical purposes. Otherwise, any list of injunctions and prohibitions would constitute ethics. Is not "Society" or "State" in some sense a reality? If determinism is accepted, how can we hold man responsible for his actions? Similarly, if there is no common conception of the Good, how can one pass judgment on another's action?

Professor Graham Wallas' *Social Judgment*, expresses its discontent with intellectualism in a different way. The book is a posthumous publication and was originally intended to form the first part of a larger volume. The author aims to show that in our social judgment emotion plays an important part. It is a mistake therefore of the classical economists that they have neglected this emotional aspect (p. 106). And the spirit that guided them was the spirit of the "new philosophy" of Copernicus and Galileo with its stress upon experimental method, which is inapplicable to the study of social sciences. Christian religion also has separated value from reasoning, and produced thereby a distorted picture of human personality and the universe.

Erica Lindsay in her *Losing Religion to Find It*, tries to reconcile many contradictions of philosophy and religion by distinguishing between intellect and intuition. Freedom and the infinite are experienced through intuition,

and law and the finite through intellect (p. 65). It is only this distinction that will settle the controversy between free-will and determinism. Similarly the question of prayer and grace lifting us above the world of cause and effect can be answered only by the recognition of intuition. So also the reconciliation in the Gospels of the kinship of Heaven and Home, of Time and Timelessness, of Inner and Outer, etc., can be effected only through its recognition. And it is only thus that the significance of the Sacrament can be understood. What we see before us, the idol, the baptismal water, etc., are but symbols, appearances of realities experienced through imagination and sympathy (pp. 227-230). The authoress has developed an important idea which offers a solution to many complex problems. But her phrase "freedom within law" does not satisfy us; we prefer "law within freedom." We accept that intuition is basal, and intellect is founded on intuition.

In some cases the distrust in intellect has resulted in the advocacy of sense life. Aldous Huxley's cult of life and "low-browism," Lawrence's cult of the primitive and the "divine abdomen," and Dr. Richards' preaching on the satisfaction of the "appetencies," are some relevant examples. Most of these disparage philosophy itself. Mr. C. E. M. Joad's *Return to Philosophy* acts as a timely check to the spread of such views. Mr. Joad defends reason, not of course in the Hegelian sense of the identity of the real and the rational, but in the sense that we cannot dispense with reasoning and philosophising. Any criticism of philosophy is always met by a *tu quoque*. Life is not valuable in itself, because "it is life that produces cruelty, torture, malice, treachery, and rape" (p. 78). A calculated restraint of impulse is necessary, and for this calculation reason is needed. Mr. Joad advocates enlightened hedonism (p. 181); yet he accepts Truth, Goodness, and Beauty as absolute values, to which he adds Happiness. He defines rational

man "as one who allows himself to be influenced by considerations which are not immediately relevant" (p. 189). But it is only one with philosophic training who can be so influenced; hence the use of philosophy. It lifts us above the departmentalism of the sciences and teaches us to look at things in their individuality. Mr. Joad recognises levels of consciousness. What the artist sees we cannot see. From ordinary knowledge to the vision of beauty there is a jump or leap of mind (p. 96). From there to the vision of mystics also we have to postulate such a jump. "These jumps are in the nature of integrations" (p. 259). When the jump to value is made, logic is transcended (p. 234) and insight attained. Philosophy enables us to develop that insight. Did the modern statesmen possess it, militant nationalism would not be advocated, and the fear of another war would not have arisen. One of the main functions of philosophy is correlation. It enables men to synthesize, quickening their intuitive insight into the real nature of things. "A little philosophy will assist men to connect and, in helping connection, will help also the civilization that is so dangerously menaced by its lack" (p. 274).

Mr. Joad has admirably defended reason, philosophy, and the absoluteness of values. But our difficulty is to understand how he can, consistently with their absoluteness, advocate the theory of enlightened hedonism. It may be that the pursuit of these values brings enlightened pleasure. But the good is not the pleasure, rather the values pursued for their own sake. Besides, is there anything in the nature of things to guarantee that the pursuit of Truth will not conflict with that of Beauty or of Goodness? If there is nothing, it would be of no use to ask man to strive for them as the ultimate aim of his life. On the other hand, if there is something, we do not see any reason why the values should

not be in the end identical. And if Mr. Joad acknowledges their ultimate identity, it will not be long before he throws his lot with the Absolutists. He may not agree with them in every detail. He may even advocate an Absolutism of his own. He may differentiate between mind and matter. But matter like everything else is an interpretation. The material object is an object of a particular level of consciousness, just as the beautiful object is an object of another level. And this recognition in no way conflicts with the advocacy of Absolutism. His theory of jumps in apprehension reminds us of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind*, and, we hope, may offer a clue to many vexed problems concerning the nature of conscious life.

According to the Hindu view, every science incident to our conscious life, must fully recognise its complex nature. Our life is not merely practical, but also emotional, intellectual, and intuitive. And the complicated problems to which it gives rise can be solved only by giving every aspect its proper place. Intuition is foundational, and in it man feels his oneness with reality. So any development of intuitive insight will be certainly a step towards truth. Sir Herbert Samuel leaves us with a sense of discontent, because he lays more emphasis on practical convenience. We may even ask the question whether there are ethics which are merely practical ethics. Professor Wallas as well as Erica Lindsay seems to err, according to us, by not distinguishing between emotion and intuition. The two are not identical. Intuition is the integrality of our conscious life, and so the matrix of emotion, intellect, and our practical life. However, the growing recognition in the West of the deeper reaches of our consciousness will eventually lead, we may hope, to the formulation of a view of life which will be acceptable both to the East and the West.

THE LAND OF PSYCHE AND OF NOUS

The medium Margery: her dentist's thumb-prints; Mr. F. Bligh Bond acts; A Division in the American S. P. R.—Spiritist versus Psychical Research—Can a Christian be a Spiritist?—The Archbishop of York denounces Spiritism—A New Religion from Etheria—H. G. Wells and Immortality: The best in Individualism and Collectivism is no answer.

The long-enduring Boston, U.S.A., embroilment over the "Margery" mediumship has had an unforeseen development, nothing less than a sorry feud between Mrs. Crandon's chief defenders on the authenticity of so-called "Walter" thumb-prints. The complete story of the dispute is now available in chronological form. On July 30th, 1926, the medium visited her dentist called Kerwin in the depositions—and obtained, for unexplained reasons, "impressions of his own thumbs in Kerr wax." At a later hour on this date "Walter" thumb-prints were produced for the first time at a "Margery" séance.* In December, 1929, the English S. P. R. lent its séance-room to Dr. and Mrs. Crandon for "Margery" demonstrations, and at one of the sittings "Walter" produced "two impressions of his right thumb," one of which he presented to Dr. Woolley, then Hon. Research Officer, and the other to Mr. Harry Price. The first of these was placed in a card-board box and kept in a locked cabinet, "the only key of which was in Dr. Woolley's custody."† He resigned in 1931, when the cabinet came under the control of Miss Newton.

In 1932, Mr. E. E. Dudley—then Research Officer of the Boston S. P. R.—also obtained thumb-prints from Kerwin, and became convinced in this manner that certain impressions, published as those of "Walter," derived from the same pair of thumbs. In December, 1932, Prof. Harold Cummins, of Tulane University, Louisiana, "a recognised authority on dermatoglyphics,"‡ was invited by Mr. Thorogood of the American S. P. R. to report whether two sets of prints were identical. Their origin was not explained, and he was unconnected with the "Margery" mediumship. He affirmed identity—that is to say, between the thumb-prints of "Walter" and the dentist Kerwin. In August, 1934, Prof. Cummins, being in England, desired to inspect the S. P. R. impressions of 1929 and any others available. On August 1, at the Society's rooms, he saw (1) the Woolley example and the specimen presented to Mr. Harry Price; (2) two examples provided for the purpose by Lord Charles Hope, same being the gift of "Walter"; (3) an impression brought by Mr. Stanley de Brath, the property of the British College of Psychic Science. Prof. Cummins

has published the results of his examination of these objects and also of "three tablets in the possession of Prof. F.C.S. Schiller," which were examined at the latter's home in Surrey, and in his presence, on August 5th.* The results follow in summary form: (1) The Price and Woolley tablets of 1929 are identical with the Kerwin right thumb. (2) The Hope tablets are typical Kerwin prints, but one of them has a second impression which is defaced and could not be analysed critically. (3) The de Brath tablet is a Kerwin print on the obverse side, but is so framed that the reverse surface of the wax could not be examined. (4) All the Schiller tablets carry impressions of the Kerwin right thumb, but two of them have also the imprint of a child's digit. Prof. Cummins points out in his "Summary" that the identity thus established cannot be explained away on the theory propounded by Mr. Thorogood† in respect of other alleged identities, namely, that Mr. Dudley had "inadvertently or wilfully" substituted Kerwin prints in place of the séance productions,‡ for the very plain reason that the accused person in question neither attended the London sittings nor has ever seen the impressions there produced. It is added that "the prints speak for themselves," offering "a simple concrete issue and one that cannot be evaded or

obscured by fatuous argument."

The scene now changes from London to New York. Prior to Jan., 1934, Mr. F. Bligh Bond, Editor of the *Journal* issued by the American S. P. R., learned from a private source that the English Society was about to publish an "expert" communication of a damaging kind on the "Walter" finger-prints, dealing with specimens that had not passed through Mr. Dudley's hands. He wrote on Jan. 1st to the President of the American body and asked for free scope to deal with the alleged facts, acknowledging them as such in the event of their substantiation. The President replied that in his Committee's opinion any adverse criticism could be dealt with when the charges were published, should necessity arise. The question stood over till May, when Mr. Bond, in the *Journal* for that month, produced the essential portions of Prof. Cummins' examination, "pursuant to an influentially signed request on the part of Voting Members of the A. S. P. R."§ The President and Committee replied by a Supplement to the May issue, pointing out (1) that a standing resolution of the board of Trustees required the Editor of the *Journal* to submit "all material proposed to be published for approval by the Executive Committee and Officers of the Society"; (2) that, following an exchange of letters, "Mr. Bond was verbally instructed

* Boston Society for Psychic Research, *Bulletin* XVIII.

† S. P. R. *Proceedings*, Vol., XLIII, p. 16.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

* *Ibid.*, pp. 18-23

† See the *Proceedings* of the American S. P. R. Vol. XXII, devoted to the problem of the prints and maintaining their authenticity.

‡ English S. P. R. *Proceedings* pp. 22, 23.

§ American S. P. R. *Journal*, pp. 130-134

that no material whatever relating to the "Margery" mediumship should be produced in the *Journal* without first being authorised by the Executive Committee of the Board.* It was put on record also that a Special Meeting of the Board of Trustees was held on May 11th, and Mr. Bond was removed unanimously from his editorial position. The correspondence followed in the Supplement, including the signed request addressed to the Editor by the Voting Members mentioned. They are seven in number, two of whom are living representatives of the late Prof. Hyslop, a former and most important President of the American Society. Unquestionably the course adopted by Mr. Bond placed the Board in an intolerable position, and his dismissal was inevitable. On the other hand, he himself is not less certainly warranted when he affirms that Mr. E. E. Dudley stands completely vindicated by the Report of Prof. Cummins. The Board, however, has been at pains to register that Mr. Bond's comments "are repudiated in whole and in each and every part." Its promised "complete discussion" of the Cummins Report is likely to accentuate further the *parti pris* which has characterised the American Society throughout its dealings with the "Walter" fingerprints. It may be added that, according to later news,† very strong efforts are being made

within the American S. P. R. to secure the reinstatement of Mr. Bligh Bond. There is also talk of a new Psychical Society, with a new official organ under his editorship.

It takes all sorts and conditions of people to make up the so-called movement of Modern Spiritism, even when the survey is confined to Great Britain, with a few of its colonies and dependencies. Side by side with the tireless courting of churches and church officials there are rather unexpected evidences of counter-views and actions. For example, a Spiritualists' National Union has been debating a question of excluding or including certain classes in its ranks. It is open only to "real Spiritualists," not to mere Psychical Researchers and still less to inquirers, while a considerable section of believers would bar Christian Spiritualists, because they are not "real" within the meaning of the dubious term, as understood by the Union. Whether the problem has been solved we do not pretend to know: it is enough that the question has been raised.‡ On the other hand, a recent "Order of the Preparation for the Communion of Souls" has been founded apparently by Church of England clergymen, an Archdeacon included, "to initiate a plan of co-operation between the churches and Spiritualism." The kind of churches does not

happen to be specified. It may be noted, however, that even the Anglican persuasion, in the person of the Archbishop of York, a not unauthorised spokesman, has depreciated the importance of survival (immortality included) from the standpoint of Christian Religion and declares that it is an undesirable subject of investigation.* The reason, as it happens, is not far to seek, the survival made evident by Spiritism—if the dead indeed return under its auspices—knowing nothing of Trinitarian Doctrine, Vicarious Atonement, Redemption by Blood, the Theological Heaven and Hell, or the Blessed Vision; what becomes of "the life everlasting," promised to the faithful by the Apostles' Creed, it might be indelicate to ask at York. The recurring subject of the Churches and Spiritism could be dismissed at this point for the time being, were it not for a voice of revelation from within the Spiritistic fold. It appears that Mr. J. Arthur Findlay, who some time since wrote on "the Edge of the Etheric" and on a certain "Rock of Truth"—which is by no means identified with the time honoured "Rock of Ages, cleft for me"—has contemplated last of all the "Unfolding Universe," and has clarified not only his views of the Hereafter but delineated "the structure of a new religion."† It is designed to supersede Christianity and has friends in "Etheria" behind it. For all we foresee

to the contrary the dwellers in that dubious region—explained with the help of diagrams in Mr. Findlay's pages—may father an official religion and church of the Unseen on believers—perhaps with Etheric rites and ceremonies. It is to be hoped indeed that they will and that it may be adopted widely, even at the risk of Mr. Findlay being Sovereign Pontiff, Great Archimandrite, or what not. Our recompense will be to cease from hearing about the identity of Christianity and Modern Spiritism, and seeing incense offered to the last clerical convert.

According to Mr. H. G. Wells, "the distressful pettiness and mortality of the individual life" must be exchanged for "subordination to the group" by those who would find something denominated "salvation," not otherwise specified in the dogmatic statement. It is likely to be expounded in the context; but this would mean re-reading Mr. Wells, a task which some of us would not undertake lightly in these days. A recent essayist suggests that the injunction implies "submission to an abstracted Overmind or a sort of Racial Man." Obviously, however, this is a mental figure, and the true implication would be bondage to a caucus at the head of the group.‡ The discussion leads on through fields of dubious speculation, "the

* *Journal*, Vol. XXIX, p. 153.

† *Light*, June 27, 1935, p. 409. Ibid July 4, p. 425.

‡ *Ibid.*, April 18, p. 250; April 25, pp. 264, 266, 267.

§ *Ibid.*, June 6, p. 355; June 20, p. 393; June 27, pp. 406, 409.

* *The Hibbert Journal*, July 1935, p. 586.

† *Light*, March 28, pp. 196, 197.

‡ *The Hibbert Journal*, July, p. 587. See "Individualism and Self-Transcendence" by the Rev. Leslie J. Belton, M. Sc.

modern apocalyptic of Spiritualism," its hither hereafter, the evidences of "multiple personality," telepathic communication, and so forth, to "the probable existence of a psychic field common to and interlinking human individuals," a "disinsulated" super-individual mind, that "comprehends all lesser minds." These and the rest of them are held to constitute "important factors" in one of the major tasks of contemporary thinkers, namely, to work out a synthesis embracing "the best in individualism"—said to be "breaking up"—and "the best in collectivism," which is trying to take its place. But it is laid down that the latter must be "purged of its disregard for personal values." Contemporary thinkers may be left to the task before them, and we shall see when the time comes whether their synthesis will remain written on paper, like More's "Utopia" and Bacon's "New Atlantis." Meanwhile, we would like to dissuade the essayist from his rather tacit assumption that schemes and dreams like these

have any part in the "self-transcendence" of the Mystics, whether in East or West. What has the "individual life" of Mr. Wells to do with the Self-knowing Spirit, the holy Spirit of Man? That is the Divinity within us, which belongs to the Divine in the universe and is never in separation therefrom. What is that which the seeker for Eternal Life is called to transcend or overcome? It is the false self, the so-called finite self, the self in the day of small things, immersed therein and circumscribed thereby. There are little handbooks already in the world, and many of them, which have told us from time immemorial how this self may be cast out and how life may be led in the Divine within us. Heaven help, if it will and they wish, the amiable "contemporary thinkers" who are or may be about to propound their synthesis. Let them leave us to our own task, which one of the elect has called "the Practice of the Presence of God." It leads where no "collectivism," purged or unpurged, has ever designed to walk.

A. E. WAITE

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"_____ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers."

—HUDIBRAS

It is but natural that our review department should receive a very large number of books which deal with the subject of mind-control and culture of concentration. Almost all of them are handed over to one who is a student of the subject, possessing knowledge of "schools" and "gurus" whose influence is widely spread in the West as well as in India. For some months we have been waiting for reviews of several volumes forwarded to "Occultus"; he now writes to us:—

My heart is disinclined to knock these publications, objectionable as they are. To begin with, to name them is to take a risk; there are very many who suffer from the itch of practising meditation and such will not be warned. But my heart is also disinclined for it is anxious to protect the writers and compilers of these books who have rushed into print without any thought of karmic responsibility entailed in the writing of these volumes. Therefore all I can manage for publication is a general note and it is my request not to name names.

We print the note, with which we are in full agreement. In our civilization authors and publishers do not consider the gravity of their acts. The general belief is that it is up to the reader to weigh the contents of any volume and judge for himself, which is true. But Karma-Nemesis does not

absolve the writer or the publisher of any book from the reactions, good or bad, produced by it on the readers' mind and character. Books which set forth and recommend actual physio-psychological practices are fraught with danger to the health and the sanity of the ordinary reader. Morality and ethics are not taken into account by modern scientists in undertaking research, in formulating theories or in offering knowledge; their example is followed by psycho-analysts and others. And as free-lance journalism is a regular trade and the number of pot-boilers is steadily on the increase the danger to the reading-public is also growing. What "Occultus" says about books on meditation also applies to numerous volumes on other topics. Here is the note:—

Dozens of volumes are published every season to supply a demand which is growing. The failure of religions and the absence of reliable scientific knowledge have sent millions a-searching after some healing method for their wandering, sick and agitated minds. Response is made by the quack and the faddist who think they have a panacea; by the charlatan who hopes to make money, or to obtain an influential position, or to secure a band of disciples; by the sincere well-wisher of his fellows who thinks he has hit upon a remedy; by the earnest individual who sits down to make a plan for others to practise; by the psychic who

has visions not understood by himself, or who fancies he has visions and is obsessed by the notion that he has a message for the world; the half-baked mystic and pseudo-occultist who is nothing more than a poseur; the sincere but misguided experimentalist who puts forward the results of his "researches"; and so we might go on. Such volumes contain truth and falsehood, harmless and dangerous practices, sane as well as questionable principles of moral conduct and, when a reader actually takes to practice, nervous breakdown, mental aberration and moral collapse too often follow. Western "psychologists" are as popular in India as self-styled "yogis" are in the West.

Here I have over a dozen recent publications. They are prepared by individuals whose sincerity of motive need not be questioned and whose desire to benefit their fellow men must win our appreciation. Moreover, the labour bestowed on some is commendable, as is also the courage displayed in others against catch-phrases and shibboleths. But what more can be said in their favour? I could quote from every one of them suggestions, recommendations, points of view and formulated practices which are faulty, or dangerous, or both. Mixed with the salt of truth, the dishes may look inviting, but—! "But who are you to pass judgment?" it might well be asked. Not attempting to formulate an exposition on the subject based on fancy or even on personal experiment and experience, but only seeking an answer from the Records of Sages as to what real meditation implies, I do not feel that I am passing judgment on these and such writings, but am only seeking to evaluate them in the light of ancient esoteric philosophy. Moreover, it is well known that grave dangers attend the practitioner who follows even a correct method of

meditation (and some in the volumes under notice are correct) without the guidance and supervision of a real Guru. Such at least is the prevailing view in the Eastern Seats of Learning.

What do real Sages of the Orient advise? What answer do they make to the beginner who asks: Is the practice of concentration good and necessary? This—

"Genuine concentration and meditation, *conscious and cautious* upon one's Lower Self in the light of the Inner Divine Man and the Paramitas (virtues recorded in the Buddhistic Discipline) is an excellent thing. But to 'sit for yoga' with only a superficial and often distorted knowledge of the real practice is almost invariably fatal; for ten to one the student will either develop mediumistic powers in himself or lose time and get disgusted both with practice and theory. Before one rushes into such a dangerous experiment and seeks to go beyond a minute examination of one's Lower Self and its walk in life, he would do well to learn at least the difference between the two aspects of Magic, the White or Divine and the Black or Devilish and assure himself that by 'sitting for yoga,' with no experience, as well as with no guide to show him the dangers, he does not daily and hourly cross the boundaries of the Divine and fall into the Satanic. Nevertheless, the way to learn the difference is very easy: one has only to remember that no esoteric truths entirely unveiled will ever be given in public print, in book or magazine; nor would any one proclaiming himself or herself in possession of or efficient to teach them be a reliable teacher though the person would feign to whisper the secrets of the hidden science."

In the above any earnest Soul has all that he needs to know for real progress. When that first step is taken the way will open.